al-islamiyah, – Hybrid Learning

JAMA’AT AL-ISLAMIYAH, AL

Batoota — Fri, 11 Jul 2014 16:12:56 +0000

JAMA’AT AL-ISLAMIYAH, AL-. A broad range of Islamic organizations in Egypt use the name alJama’at al-Islamiyah (Islamic Groups). These groups operate primarily through independent mosques and student unions on university campuses and appeal primarily to Egyptian youths. There does not appear to be any single leadership uniting the various groups; rather, they represent the general trend in Egyptian society toward Islamic resurgence. However, since the mid-1980s an increasing number of clashes have occurred in Upper Egypt between government forces and more politically militant groups acting under the banner of al-Jama’at al-Islamiyah. The self-proclaimed leader of these groups is Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman (Umar ‘Abd alRahman), a blind preacher from al-Fayyum who lived in exile in the United States in the early 1990s. The use of the term al-Jama`at al-Islamiyah originated in the early 1970s under the new government of President Anwar Sadat. Sadat released members of alIkhwan al-Muslimun (the Muslim Brotherhood) who had been imprisoned under President Gamal Abdel Nasser and officially permitted new Islamic organizations to form under the umbrella of al-Jama’at alIslamiyah. This move to reconstruct the conservative religious sectors of society was an early sign of Sadat’s intention to shift Egypt’s political course. Through the 1970s, as Sadat developed his plans to restructure the Egyptian political economy, these Islamic groups served as an important counterbalance to the old Nasserist constituency and other groups further to the left. While the regime reduced government programs and encouraged general privatization, the number of private (ahh) mosques in the country doubled in one decade from twenty thousand to forty thousand. These private mosques and the many Islamic organizations associated with them began to play an important role in large urban areas, including Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez in Lower Egypt, and Asyut, alFayyum, and al-Minya in Upper Egypt. Continued rural migration to these cities, combined with the government’s restructuring policy, exacerbated social and economic tensions and led to a growing sense of urban alienation. While the government reduced its social welfare programs, the activities of al-Jama’at al-Islamiyah provided a social safety net at private mosques, with centers for food and clothing distribution as well as for the study of the Qur’an. These mosques also had new independent sources of funding in the form of private remittances from members’ relatives who migrated to work in the Arab Gulf countries during the oil-boom years. An additional factor affecting the growth of the movement was the expansion of the country’s university system, especially in Upper Egypt where new campuses were founded in the 1970s in al-Minya, al-Fayyum, Sohag, Qina, and Aswan. Students at these schools and the older university in Asyut organized unions and fraternities under the name of al-Jama’at al-Islamiyah. By the late 1970s, as Sadat faced growing opposition at home for signing the Camp David peace treaty with Israel, there were a number of independent religious leaders associated with al-Jama’at al-Islamiyah who became very popular for their outspoken criticism of the Sadat regime. Prominent among these were Shaykh Ahmad al-Mahallawi at Qd’id Ibrahim Mosque in Alexandria and Shaykh Hafiz Salamah of al-Shuhada’ Mosque in Suez and al-Nur Mosque in Cairo. Just before his assassination in 1981, Sadat made public attacks on both Shaykh Mahallawi and Shaykh Salamah. Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman was also critical of the regime and was later charged with having links to the Jihad group that carried out Sadat’s assassination, but was not found guilty. In the government crackdown on public opposition both before and after Sadat’s assassination, each of these religious leaders experienced state censorship and imprisonment. It is difficult to generalize about the ideology, practices, and aims of the various al-Jama’at al-Islamiyah organizations. In general, they advocate stronger Islamic rule and oppose non-Islamic practices in Egyptian society. They call for the adoption of shari`ah, the Islamic legal code, as the official law of the state, and they oppose attempts by the government to control and supervise the work of mosques and religious groups through the shaykh of al-Azhar and the Ministry of Awqaf. More than other al-Jama’at leaders, Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman has denounced the official religious institutions of the state and has even been critical of entry by moderates in the Ikhwan into electoral party politics. After the Iranian revolution he identified closely with its Islamic government and urged his followers to confront the Egyptian government directly for its non-Islamic practices. The Egyptian government and official media have attempted to link Shaykh Omar with the clandestine and subversive Jihad group, but he has always denied the connection. The main difference between his activities and those of Jihad is that he openly sought to mobilize popular resistance to the government through his public preaching and the organizing of large conferences in cities along the Nile river. By the summer of 1988 there were an increasing number of clashes in al-Fayyum, alMinya, and other cities in Asyut province between the local police and his followers as they left mosques after the Friday sermons. Cities and universities throughout the area experienced increasing repression by the state as the government closed mosques, disrupted student union elections, and banned all activities under the name al-Jama’at al-Islamiyah. As tensions rose there were reports of house-to-house police searches, mass arrests in the thousands, and an increasing number of killings in many cities of Upper Egypt. In 1988 and 1989 Shaykh Omar was arrested and detained on at least two occasions. During his imprisonment, his followers staged large protests that led to further confrontations with the police; there were also demonstrations of support reported in the Cairo suburbs of Imbabah and `Ayn Shams, indicating his broad following and the shared identity of al-Jama’at organizations around Egypt. As the clashes between the government and al-Jama’at continued, Shaykh Omar left the country, reportedly first to Afghanistan and Pakistan and then to the United States. Following Shaykh Omar’s exile the level of conflict between al-Jama’at followers and the government increased, with military troops, armored cars, and helicopters deployed to several cities. The nature of the confrontation also assumed three new forms. First, the political assassinations of People’s Assembly speaker Rif at al-Mahjub in October 1990 and of liberal author Faraj Fawdah in June 1992, were blamed on al-Jama`at and said to have been ordered by Shaykh Omar. Attacks on prominent officials continued, such as the attempted assassination of Prime Minister `Atif Sidqi, in November 1993. Second, in 1991 violent sectarian clashes between Muslims and Christians erupted in several cities of Upper Egypt, notably Dayrut; the government claimed these were instigated by members of al-Jama’at, but they mainly resulted from old social rivalries. Third, by late 1992 extremist elements in al-Jama`at claimed responsibility for at least two attacks on foreign tourists visiting pharaonic monuments in Upper Egypt. The government claimed the al-Jama`at were pursuing a new strategy to disrupt the tourist trade and thus damage the national economy. These attacks on foreign tourists continued into 1993 In the summer of 1992 the government passed a strict new antiterrorism law limiting al-Jama’at’s activities, and in the fall it announced that all mosques and prayer leaders would be put under state control. In August 1992 the government claimed to have arrested twentyfive leaders of al-Jama’at, including two forei
gn citizens-a Sudanese and Jordanian-at an organizational meeting in Alexandria. The government has always maintained that al-Jama`at is foreign-inspired, primarily by Iranians and Sudanese, and it now claimed to have exposed this international connection. Despite these arrests, however, al-Jama’at will probably remain a significant factor in Egyptian society; it has wide appeal among the youth and university students and seems to have established popular roots in several parts of the country. It is also unlikely that the Egyptian government will be able to establish state control over the thousands of independent mosques that have served as the base of the movement. Many Egyptian political analysts see the government’s conflict with al-Jama’at continuing and perhaps intensifying, and indeed from June 1993 the government has shed an earlier hesitation to carry out the execution of Islamists convicted in military tribunals. It is unlikely, however, that al-Jama’at will be able to seize power from the present ruling elite in Egypt, not only because the elite is shielded by a powerful security apparatus and the army, backed by the “silent majority” of the middle classes and intelligentsia, but also because al-Jama’at ultimately lacks the organizational strength and cohesion necessary to assume popular leadership. [See also Egypt; Fundamentalism; Muslim Brotherhood, article on Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; Organization of the Islamic Jihad; and the biography of Abdel Rahman.] BIBLIOGRAPHY Ansari, Hamied. “The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 16 (1984): 123-144. Ayubi, Nazih N. “The Politics of Militant Islamic Movements in the Middle East.” Journal of International Affairs 36 (Fall 1982-Winter 1983): 271-283. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Daily Reports: Near East and South Asia. New Canaan, Conn., 1980-1992. Summary of Arab newspapers and radio broadcasts. Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. “Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12 (1980): 423-453. Kupferschmidt, Uri M. “Reformist and Militant Islam in Urban and Rural Egypt.” Middle Eastern Studies 23 (October 1987): 403-418. McDermott, Anthony. “Mubarak’s Egypt: The Challenge of the Militant Tendency.” The World Today 42.1o (October 1986). Sayyid Ahmad, Muhammad. “Egypt: The Islamic Issue.” Foreign Policy, no. 69 (Winter 1987-1988): 22-39. Sonbol, Amira El Azhary. “Egypt.” In The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity, edited by Shireen Hunter, pp. 23-38. Bloomington, 1988. IBRAHIM IBRAHIM

HIZB AL-DA`WAH AL-ISLAMIYAH

Batoota — Mon, 10 Jun 2013 08:50:28 +0000

HIZB AL-DA`WAH AL-ISLAMIYAH. One of the three most important activist ShIN organizations in opposition to Saddam Hussein’s Bath regime in Iraq, and the oldest among them, is the Hizb al-Da’wah alIslamiyah (Islamic Call Party). The others are the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, founded in Iran in November 1982, and the Organization of Islamic Action, founded in Karbala in the 1960s.
Political History and Program. The party (known in short form simply as the Da’wah) was established in October 1957 in Najaf by the young and ingenious Shi’i religious authority, Muhammad Bagir al-Sadr (born in 1933 in Kazimayn, Baghdad, and executed by the Bath in April 198o). Cofounders were a group of junior Shi`i clergy, some of whom achieved great prominence in later years (chiefly Muhammad Bagir and Mahdi, the two sons of Iraq’s then chief mujtahid Muhsin al-Haknn, as well as two lay intellectuals). The decision to found a political party (which al-Sadr, using a Qur’anic expression, dubbed Hizb Allah, “Party of God”), whose sole purpose would be to call the people of Iraq back to Islam, was the result of the young clergy’s realization that Islam and, in particular, Shi’i Islam in Iraq was on the decline. Owing to a number of political, social, and economic developments under the monarchy, the number of students of religion in the two holy cities of Najaf and Karbala had declined steeply and many young Shi`is were estranged from religion and, markedly so, from the religious establishment. Under the republican regime of `Abd al-Karim Qasim, (14 July 1958-8 February 1963), followed by the short-lived Bath regime of 1963 and that of the `Arif brothers, `Abd al-Salam and `Abd al-Rahman (18 November 1963-17 July 1968), relations between the Shi’i establishment of the holy cities and the government were tense, but both sides refrained from drastic action. The regimes tolerated de facto Shi`i autonomy in the religious educational institutions (alhawzat al-`ilmiyah) of Najaf and Karbala, and the latter, for their part, kept their protest against the secularizing Sunni ruling elites within strict limits. These circumstances permitted the Da`wah to operate almost without restriction, not only in Najaf but also in Baghdad. (Indeed, the main opposition to its activity came, in those days, from the more conservative circles within the religious university of Najaf, who regarded activity along modern party lines as deviation from tradition. As a result, so as not to compromise his position as a mujtahid, Sadr was eventually forced to sever his organizational ties with the party.) The Da’wah’s main activity in Baghdad was aimed to win over young lay Shl’! intellectuals (a few Sunnis joined the party as well, but they were a small minority), and thus it concentrated its main effort among the students of Baghdad University and young professionals, as well as among high school students. Almost all the recruiting activity within these circles was conducted by lay university students and graduates.
At the same time, the party tried to expand its influence among the Shi`i poor in the al-Thawrah slum (later Saddam City) on the outskirts of Baghdad, but this was done, mainly, through party members who were junior clergy. Until the Bath came to power (and, indeed, even two or three years afterward) this activity was carried out almost openly, with little or no official interference. It involved public prayers, gatherings to celebrate Islamic festivals, Islamic placards, and, for the hard core of activists, classes led by al-Sadr and others in Qur’an interpretation and some advanced Islamic studies. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Da’wah expanded its activities to other parts of the Shi’i world, notably to Lebanon. According to an interview with a senior member in the 1 960s to disguise its activity somewhat, the Da’wah also called itself the Fatimid Party (al-Hizb al-Fatim-1) after Fatimah alZahra’, `Ali’s wife and the Prophet’s daughter.
In the second half of 1969, the Bath regime, when trying to eliminate the Shi`i educational autonomy, cracked down in an unprecedented way on the hawzdt of Najaf and Karbala. This marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration of relations between the two establishments. The Da’wah’s activities, too, were severely restricted, and, eventually, it was forced to go underground. This, as well as its own theory of action that dictated a leap into political activity after a few years of purely educational work, drove the party to become progressively more militant. In 1970, the party’s first member was martyred, and in 1974 the regime executed five more senior members. As reported by its own sources, in February 1977 the party was deeply involved in organizing the vast antigovernment demonstrations that occurred during a mass pilgrimage to Karbala to commemorate the anniversary of the fortieth day after the martyrdom of Imam Husayn. But the Da’wah’s main political and guerrilla thrust occurred soon thereafter under the influence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s February 1979 takeover in Iran. The party then engaged in organizing mass Shi`i antiBa’th demonstrations and armed attacks against Bath party and internal security centers, all in an attempt to topple the regime and replace it with an Iranian-style Islamic republic. As a result of the regime’s crackdown, hundreds of party members (including al-Sadr who, by then, no longer belonged officially to the party, but who remained its intellectual mentor) were executed, a few thousand members and supporters were arrested, and most other members fled the country.
Throughout the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) the Da`wah’s activity was fourfold: it acted inside Iraq, sporadically hitting at Bath targets; it had a small, regular unit that fought on Iran’s side against Iraq; it carried out terrorist activities against pro-Iraqi regimes in the Middle East, chiefly in Kuwait, and against Western targets; and it endeavored to incorporate new members and supporters from among the Iraqi Shl’! expatriates in the West and in Iran. At the end of the war, in order to improve its image in the West, the party stopped all armed activities outside of Iraq. During the Kuwait crisis (August 1990-March 1991) and following it, the party initiated a number of overtures toward Western governments, notably the United States and Britain, as well as toward anti-Ba’thist, pro-Western Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia, with which they were at loggerheads during the Iraq Iran War. Another aspect of their growing pragmatism was a claim, voiced by some of the party’s spokesmen (but clearly not by all), to be in favor of Western-style liberal parliamentary democracy. As those spokesmen put it, if the majority in post-Saddam Iraq were to reject their notion of an Islamic republic, the party would accept the majority verdict. It then would continue its educational work designed to persuade the people of the need for such an Islamic rule. It is far too early to judge whether this claim to democracy represents a genuine change of heart.
In the era after the Iraq-Iran war some differences within the party between those whose main activity was in Iran and those who lived and worked in the West have been exposed. One major difference concerned the degree to which the party ought to be independent of Iranian dictates, now that the interest of the Iraqi opposition in continuing the struggle and that of the Iranian state in increasing stability were incompatible. Another difference, albeit a less important one, was over the degree of clarity with which the party should express its commitment to democracy. Those members operating in Iran (led by the party’s spokesman Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi al-Asafi) have been rather vague about democracy and have been receptive to Iranian policy dictates, whereas some party members who live in the West have inclined toward more independence and democracy. During the Kuwait crisis, the party suffered from at least one split. The new group, calling itself the Cadres of the Iraqi Islamic Da’wah Party (Kawadir Hizb al-Da’wah alIslamiyah al-`Iraqi), emphasizes its Iraqi identity and “the independence of the Islamic Iraqi decision-making” of Iranian policy. In addition, it claims that, for more than a decade, the Da’wah has failed to provide a plan of action, and that an urgent need for such a plan exists. It is typical, however, of this closely knit and highly ideological movement that the two factions restrain their argument and refrain from the acrimonious accusations so widespread in political disputes in the Middle East.
The contribution of Da’wah activists to the anti-Ba’thist Shi’i intifadah or uprising of March 1991 is unclear. According to party members’ reports, they were active in encouraging the masses to revolt, but it is clear that most of the uprising was spontaneous. Moreover, there is little doubt that a rival Shl’! opposition organization, the Tehran-based Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was more prominent, sending into Iraq many hundreds of its Iran-based membership. Whatever the case, the regime’s crackdown that followed weakened the party organization inside Iraq: members who exposed themselves during the revolt were later jailed or executed Organization. Owing to the requirements of its underground activity, the precise organizational structure of the party is a well-guarded secret. However, its general outlines may still be delineated. At the top of what is described as “a pyramidal structure” stands a collective body of around ten. Its first name was Majlis al-Fuqaha’ (Council of Jurists); in later years it also included a few laymen, though they are still a small minority. In its contemporary incarnation it is reported as being called al-Qiyadah al `Ammah (General Leadership). One level lower is the Council of Leadership (Majlis al-Qiyadah) that consists of a few scores of activists. Its more contemporary name is either the General Congress (al-Mu’tamar al-`Amm), or the Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyasi). This body, which consists mostly of lay intellectuals who represent their respective territorial branches, directs the day-to-day activity of the party branches. Under it one finds an unknown number of lower levels, ending with the basic unit, the Family (al-Usrah) or the Ring (al-Halaqah). Inside Iraq, to minimize the danger of exposure, an ordinary member knows only other members of his own basic unit, and only vertical contacts between units are maintained. This structure is strongly influenced by the organizational structures of the Communist and Bath parties. Al-Sadr was the first to acknowledge that any organizational form was legitimate if it could spread “the call” more efficiently, and as long as it was not forbidden by the shad `ah. “The Prophet,” he explained, “had he lived in our age, would have used . . . the modern and suitable means of communications and spreading of the message.” In Europe, where there is no danger of suppression, the lowest echelon is the local branch, apparently combining all party members in a town.
Ecumenism versus Particularism. On the face of it, the position of the Da’wah publications is ecumenical. The party calls for the establishment of a full-fledged Islamic regime in Iraq that would apply the rules of the shari `ah to every walk of life, regardless of differences between Sunni and Shl’! Islam (and, indeed, the differences between them in terms of substantive law are very small). A more careful reading, however, reveals strong Shi`i undertones; for example, there are occasional inferences that once Saddam Hussein and his Bath regime are toppled, Shiism would become the dominant power in Iraq’s political life. Shi`i youth are called upon to be ready to sacrifice themselves, as did Imam Husayn and most other Shi i imams. Although such appeals make it difficult for Sunnis to join the movement, this has not prevented the Da’wah from establishing cordial relations with the main (Sunni) Kurdish opposition organizations. Unsurprisingly, however, the party has somewhat uneasy relations with the other main Shi`i opposition groups, for they are all competing for the allegiance of the Iraqi Shi’i expatriates in Iran and Europe. The party’s ideas were first expressed by al-Sadr in a magazine, Al-adwd’ (The Lights), issued by an activist group of `ulama’ in Najaf in the early I96os. The party’s own first magazine was called Sawt al-da’wah (Voice of the Da’wah), and it, too, came out in Najaf in the midand late 1960s. During most of the 1980s and the early 1990s, its main publications have been a weekly issued in Tehran, Al-jihad, and another issued in London, Sawt al-`Iraq (Voice of Iraq). The cadres issue a weekly magazine called Fajr al-`Iraq (Iraq’s Dawn).
[See also Iraq; shi’i Islam, article on Modern ShN Thought; and the biography of Sadr]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baram, Amatzia/ “Two Roads to Revolutionary Shi`i Fundamentalism Iraq: Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya and the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq.” In Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, pp. 531-586. Chicago, 1994.
AMATZIA BARAM

DAWLAH AL-ISLAMIYAH, AL-

Batoota — Tue, 06 Nov 2012 09:06:11 +0000

AL-DAWLAHAL-ISLAMIYAH, See Islamic State.