Institutionalization

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, modern Islamic da’wah has become a major issue of newly established Islamic institutions and organizations. The Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II had already included the concept of da’wah in his “imperial ideology,” supporting his claim to be the caliph of the Islamic ummah (“nation”). `Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi embodied the call to the righteous of (Salafi) Islam into the duties of his fictitious Society for the Edification of the Unitarians (Jam’iyat Ta’lim al-Muwahhidin). But whereas the classical Salafiyah had stressed the concept of tarbiyah (educating the Muslim believers), independent nonscholarly organizations of the neo-Salafiyah put da’wah into the foreground of their political and cultural activities. During the 1930s in Egypt, two competing organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan alMuslimun) and the Association of Young Muslims (Jam’Iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin), not only propagated a temporary withdrawal from society (hijrah) but also called on Muslim youth to join the new groups in accordance with the Qur’an (3.104): “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong. These are the ones to attain felicity.” By using this Qur’anic verse, they tried to legitimate their claim to independent authority in a nation-state community. In a way, da’wah still meant the call to become a member of the only righteous Islamic community within the Muslim ummah.
In a different manner, the Society for Teaching and Propagation (Jama’at al-Tabligh wa-al-Da’wah; more commonly referred to as the Tabligh! (Jama’at of the Indian Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1944) had already stressed the necessity of a missionary duty of da’wah. Of Sufi background, the Tabligh! (Jama’at focused on Muslim communities in the peripheries as well as on neighboring non-Muslims. The large mystical organizations were better able to cover the needs of proselytes in the peripheries than the political associations-of the neo-Salafiyah. InWest Africa, it was mainly the Sanusiyah and the Tijaniyah that helped to spread Islam in hitherto non-Muslim territories. Likewise, such sects as the Ahmadi-yah and the Isma`iliyah used the concept of da’wah to campaign for proselytes chiefly in communities to which Muslims had migrated but constituted a minority.
Missionary activities of the new Islamic organizations were still marginal and restricted to sporadic activities of several centers of Islamic learning. Thus, during the sessions of the General Islamic Congress of Jerusalem in 1931, Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) was able to revive his small Society of Call and Guidance (Jam`iyat al-Da’wah wa-al-Irshad), which he had founded in 1911 and which he had wanted to become a cornerstone of Ottoman Pan-Islamic activities. Only after the end of World War II  did the political tendency to establish transnational Islamic bodies activate the idea of propagating Islam outside the sphere of the ummah as well. The short-lived Islamic Conference, established bySaudi Arabia,Egypt, andPakistanin 1954, demanded that the spread of Islam become a major task of “Islamic work.” Da’wah was now understood to be an integral part of the concept of wahdah (unity): transnational organizations should simultaneously represent the will of the Muslim community to live in a single, at least culturally unified, ummah and to work to spread the true teachings of Islam.
During the Arab Cold War (1957-1967), da`wah work attained greater recognition inSaudi   Arabia. Saudi politicians realized the possibility of broadening their political and cultural influence by “promulgating the word of God, promoting the message of Islam and bringing the Moslems back to the orbit of Islam” (Mohammed Ahmad Bashmeel [Bashmil], Nationalism in Islam; Beirut, 1962, p. 92). On 24 October 1961, the Saudi Government opened a new Islamic university inMedina, the task of which was to train Islamic workers for da’wah in minority communities. In addition, the Muslim World League, founded in May 1962, included da`wah in its covenant in order “to unify and to spread the Muslims’ word.”
In the 1960s, Islamic da’wah was promoted by at least three different types of organizations: interstate or state organizations, such as the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs (al-Majlis al-A`la lil-Shu’un al-Islamiyah), founded in Cairo in 1960, or the Islamic University in Medina; state-sponsored transnational organizations, such as the Saudi-based Muslim World League; and nongovernmental organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Tablighi Jama’at.
However, the limited influence of transnational organizations was remarkable: in 1965, the Muslim World League had only fifty Islamic workers under contract, whereas the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs disposed of hundreds of students who had been trained at alAzhar and who continued to work for the da’wah policy of the university. Obviously, state-sponsored organizations, which claimed nevertheless to be “totally independent,” had difficulties in developing a profile of their own in the field of da’wah. Divergent cultural and political tendencies assembled under the roof of a transnational organization competed for the contents of the true Islamic teaching and thus paralyzed da’wah. By way of contrast, state organizations or nongovernmental groups like the Muslim Brotherhood possessed a clearer Islamic political program, either in the interest of the government or as a result of a specific ideology.
In the early 1970s, when Islamic politics were becoming a major expression of political and cultural struggle, the da’wah of the transnational organizations gained greater attention from the Islamic public. In December 1972, the Wahhabi- community inSaudi Arabiaorganized an International Youth Conference for Islamic Da’wah, which became the foundation stone of the new Saudi-sponsored World Assembly of Muslim Youth (alNadwah al-`Alami-yah lil-Shabab al-Islami). In May 1972, the Libyan Government inaugurated a new transnational da’wah organization, the Islamic Call Society (Jam’Iyat al-Da’wah al-Islamiyah), which during the first ten years of its existence hardly exercised any influence in the field of international da’wah politics. After having been reorganized in 1982, however, a new suborganization of this society, the World Council for Islamic Call (al-Majlis al `Alami- lil-Da`wah alIslamiyah) became the most important competitor of the Saudi-based Muslim World League and a mouthpiece for Mu’ammar al-Qadhdhafi’s Third Theory.
The simultaneous foundation of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and the Islamic Call Society demonstrates that the concept of da`wah was now also applied to the propagation of specific ideological and theological currents that legitimated Saudi and Libyan rule, respectively.
The disappointing effects of international da`wah, the foundation of new state agencies, and the spontaneous emergence of new radical Islamic political groups stressed the need for coordination and cooperation. In 1973, the Muslim World League accepted volunteers from the Azhar Academy of Islamic Research (Majma` al-Buhuth al-Islamiyah), founded in 1961-1964, in order to fulfill the duties of Islamic work inAfricaand
Southeast Asia. In September 1975, the Muslim World League held the Mosque Message Conference, an international da’wah conference, inMecca. The league proposed the total reorganization of international da’wah activities and the highlighting of mosques as the focal point of da’wah. Accordingly, the World Council of Mosques was established in 1975. Within ten years, the league succeeded in founding several regional branches of this council, which was clearly regarded as a counterweight to the World Council of Churches. Nevertheless, the number of da’wah activists increased only gradually. Although the Muslim World League boasted of cooperating with more than a thousand Islamic organizations all over the world, in 1985 it had only 1,000 Islamic workers under contract (36o in Africa, 473 in Asia, and 167 in Europe and theAmericas).
After this reorganization of the institutional field of da`wah, the major transnational Islamic organizations were confronted with new developments resulting from the revolutionary propaganda of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian leadership had set up an Organization for Islamic Propaganda (Munazzamat-i I’lam-i Islami) with the rank of a state ministry whose purpose was to win non-Shi`i Muslims for the Islamic revolution. Da`wah was again aimed more at attracting supporters for a specific political ideology than at recruiting proselytes. Depending on the direct support of the patron regime, political da’wah also followed fluctuations in the government’s domestic and foreign policy strategies: in 1982, the Iranian regime began to emphasize its Shi`i background, thus forcing the propaganda organization to join in this spirit.
From 1982 on, the competition among the major transnational organizations created a new geographical distribution of da’wah activities: the Iranian activists stressed the importance of working among Muslim communities in the Western world; the Muslim World League tried to consolidate its da’wah activities in East Africa, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan; the Libyan Islamic Call Society chiefly intervened in West Africa and in South America. The Cairo-based Higher Council of Islamic Affairs tried to steer clear from this competition and continued to recruit its activists from those parts of the Islamic world that kept traditional contacts with al-Azhar.
In addition to these important da’wah organizations, at least fifteen other bodies and agencies have hoped to gain recognition in the Islamic world by starting independent da’wah activities. Most of the rich Islamic countries established da’wah organizations of their own (e.g.,Kuwait’s al-Hay’ah al-Khayriyah al-Islamiyah al`Alamiyah orIraq’s Munazzamat al-Mu’tamar al-Islami al-Sha’bi). The resultant social and cultural competition was to be countered by the establishment of a new coordination council. In 1988, seventeen organizations founded the World Islamic Council for Propagation and Relief (al-Majlis al-`Alami al-Islam! lil-Da’wah wa-alIghathah). The Muslim World League had already started to integrate da’wah activities with relief work in 1981. The idea was to direct da’wah to those communities and localities that were affected by natural disaster, unemployment, or poverty. In this way, the dais (agents of da’wah) would demonstrate that Islam also helps to cover the basic needs of humankind and that the Islamic ummah is a singular expression of solidarity and humanity.
In general, however, several structural factors constituted a major obstacle to the success of institutionalized da’wah:
First, transnational da’wah was not able to mobilize local forms of Islamic culture, as it had to follow the Salafi tradition, which demanded the abolition of local Islamic cults and cultures. Accordingly, da`wah activists were able to gain influence only among those urban communities that were in a similar social and cultural position. The new Muslim immigrant communities in Europe, for instance, which had lost their traditional cultural bonds, were much more ready to accept the supremacy of one of these bodies than communities in Africa orSoutheast Asia.
Second, foreign Muslim activists were scarcely able to penetrate into the local culture of, for instance, the heterogenous ethnic communities of West Africa. Although it was often stated that the Arabic language should be the language of da’wah, communication between the dais and the community was most unlikely in such a case. Likewise, all publications of the transnational organizations were either in Arabic, English, or French. Yet those who were able to speak and read French or English were already connected to an international culture and thus were not predisposed to join the organizational field of Islamic da’wah.
Third, as all the transnational bodies identified da`wah with an increase in the institutionalization of Islamic culture within the scope of their specific ideological tendencies, the success of their work was measured by an increase in membership. Consequently, da’wah was far more able to mobilize already existing institutions, such as small mosques or political communities, which were ready to join a hierarchical, institutional system.
Fourth, because political da’wah favored the patronage of a single regime-be itSaudi Arabia,Iran, or Libya-new members also had to identify with these regimes. However, serious political problems often evolved out of the shifts in state politics.
Whereas al-Azhar or the Muslim World League tried to reduce the political contents of da’wah to a minimum, the Libyan and Iranian organizations, and to a certain extent the Saudi-sponsored World Assembly of Muslim Youth, acted far more politically. Consequently, they seemed to be able to mobilize communities on a specific issue (e.g., the Salman Rushdie affair in 1989), but failed to gain lasting influence, as spontaneous mass mobilization seldom helps to create an institutional basis. Thus, the influence of the Muslim World League inSudanoutlasted all political changes that took place during the years 1983 to 1990, and Libyan influence inBurkina FasoandMauritaniadepended on the degree of consensus between the regimes involved.
Institutional da’wah carried out by independent nongovernmental organizations has had different objectives that have helped the organizations to surpass political difficulties. The Ahmadlyah mission, for instance, was not encumbered with the patronage of a specific regime. Likewise the da`wah of the Tablighi communities was more successful in Western societies, since hardly anyone imputed to them propaganda in favor of a particular regime. Apparently, the Islamic mission outside Muslim communities is mainly supported by independent, often informal, Islamic groups, whereas the institutionalized da`wah of the large Islamic organizations like the Muslim World League aims principally at integrating Muslim communities whose transnational affiliation is not clear. Thus, in a way, institutionalized da’wah supports the regrouping of the heterogenous Islamic culture.
At an early stage, the Muslim World League had recognized the important role of modern media in the creation of an Islamic da`wah network. In 1984, the league integrated its da’wah apparatus within its Section Six (“media”). In 1977, on the occasion of a da`wah conference inMedina, all delegates had criticized the poor quality of Islamic media. And it was stated that in almost all regions where da`wah was to be carried out, Islamic media were practically nonexistant. In order to solve this problem, the league organized an international media conference inJakartain September 198o, during which the delegates passed a Covenant of Islamic Media. The major part of the conference’s decisions dealt with institutional questions (e.g., the establishment of a Higher International Council for Islamic Media). It soon became clear, however, that by incorporating da’wah within the field of international or regional media, the delegates were confronted with the question of how to deal with the ideological and theological contents of da`wah. The only common ground was the so-called ideological threats to which the Muslim communities felt exposed. Thus, conference members agreed that media should fight against socialist and atheist ideas, Christian mission, and “pseudo-Islamic groups.” Nevertheless, ideas that could have marked the guidelines of the theoretical and practical contents of da’wah were still missing.
It is clear that institutionalizing da’wah has not automatically guaranteed success. On the contrary, the more da`wah has been made a task of the large Islamic organizations, the more it has been paralyzed by institutional hierarchies and neutralized by the divergent Islamic tendencies that these organizations represent. In fact, institutional da`wah continues to be mainly a medium of the patron regimes for the establishment of an informal, but religiously legitimated, foreign policy.
[See also Azhar, al-; Communications Media; Islamic Call Society; Muslim World League; Tablighi Jama`at.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Draguhn, Werner, ed. Der EinfluB des Islams auf Politik, Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft in Siidostasien.Hamburg, 1983. Collection of essays on Islam and da’wah activities inSoutheast Asia.
Kramer, Martin. Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses.New York, 1986. Excellent introduction to the history of the Muslim Congress movement, 188o to 1939.
Landau, Jacob. The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization.Oxford, 1990. One of the best studies on Pan-Islam to date. The author concentrates on the earlier periods, 188o to 1939.
Mattes, Hanspeter. Die innere and auBere Mission Libyens.Mainz, 1986. Insightful analysis of Libyan missionary activities.
Otayek, Rend, ed. Le radicalisme islamique au sud duSahara: Da’wa, arabisation et critique de l’Occident.Paris, 1993. Collection of essays on da’wah activities inAfrica.
Piscatori, J. P. Islam in a World of Nation-States.Cambridge, 1986. Most useful discussion of the role of Islam in nation-state societies, with many important references to da’wah organizations.
Schulze, Reinhard. Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Islamischen Weltliga.Leiden, 1990. Gives a history of Islamic transnationalism and of the Muslim World League.
Sharipova, Raisa M. Panislamizm Segodnia: Ideologia i praktika Ligi
Islamskogo Mira.Moscow, 1986. Description and interpretation of the Muslim World League from a political point of view.
REINHARD SCHULZE

Modern Usage

Literally meaning “claim, prayer, invocation,” da`wah has been defined by Frederick M. Denny in the Encyclopedia of Religion (New York, 1987, vol. 4, p. 244) as “a religious outreach or mission to exhort people to embrace Islam.” The Muslim da’wah literature generally agrees with this definition. In modern usage, however, da’wah has acquired meanings other than “mission” and “conversion.” Studying modern manifestations of da`wah, one discerns four obvious trends-political orientation, interiorization, institutional organization, and social-welfare concern.
Political Orientation. Da’wah was used as a call to establish an alternative political order in the early history of Islam, for instance by the Khawarij and ‘Abbasids against the Umayyads and by the Isma`ilis against the `Abbasids, but it became gradually divested of this political orientation in later periods. Muslim political theorists generally mentioned da’wah as one of the duties of a caliph, but this duty was rarely realized in practice. This caliphal doctrine was used rather to redefine da’wah in terms of preaching and to control da’wah efforts, particularly to constrain them from seeking politi-Calobjectives.
The doctrine of da`wah as a caliphal duty was revived in the nineteenth century by the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909), giving it an entirely new meaning. Instead of referring to preaching and jihad, this caliphal duty was now defined to extend the caliph’s authority over Muslims in other countries, analogous to the Catholic pope. Although Abdulhamid II used the idea for his own political purposes, it was also readily accepted by the West, largely because, as Thomas Arnold argued in The Caliphate (1924), many Western scholars had already compared the caliph with the pope. In addition, some European statesmen and scholars like W. S. Blunt found this doctrine of da’wah useful in promoting Arab nationalism. Blunt, who believed that Muslims would have a better future if political power were shifted from the Turks to the Arabs, proposed in The Future of Islam (1882) that the Ottoman caliph should only be the spiritual head of all Muslims, while executive and administrative powers should be placed in the hands of regional Arab rulers.
In this context da’wah immediately became a political instrument to propagate Islamic unity. The doctrine of da’wah as a caliphal function brought Muslims in different territories together under one spiritual head. Da`wah for the unity of the Muslims was systematically developed by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), who founded the Jam’iyat al-`Urwat al-Wuthqa (Society of the Reliable Bond), a da’wah organization promoting Muslim solidarity.
Improved means of communication and news media in the twentieth century increased awareness among Muslim communities, which had remained largely isolated from one another until then. This awareness led to the growth of a sense of solidarity. The political context of democracy and nation-states heightened the importance of attracting large numbers of supporters. The vigorous Christian missionary work of this period was viewed by Muslims as a political threat because it was seen as an effort to increase the number of Christians in Muslim areas. Da’wah organizations like al-Da’wah waal-Irshad (Da’wah and Guidance), founded by Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935), were established in response to the perceived threat.
The ideas of nationalism and nation-state also led to the politicization of da’wah. These ideas called for local self-government and the expulsion of colonial rulers. Since the obvious point of difference between the colonists and the indigenous population was generally religion, the struggle against colonial rule was defined as da’wah to seek independence from non-Muslim rule and to establish or restore dar al-Islam. This interpretation of political action was found convenient because it could be claimed as a religious right from the colonial government, and action against the government could be justified as struggle for religious freedom. Moreover, this da’wah helped popularize political movements because it provided a broader base for developing national identity in countries of ethnic and linguistic diversity. Finally, national political movements based on such da’wah could win the sympathy of similar political movements in other Muslim areas.
Da’wah as state ideology emerged more clearly in the 1960s under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970). He established a da’wah network in the Middle East and Africa with the help ofal-AzharUniversityin order to promote Islam, the Arabic language, and Arab nationalism. Other Muslim states, sensing in the influence of his da`wah a threat to their national sovereignty, organized their own da`wah in line with their particular interests.
To combat Arab nationalist da’wah these Muslim states highlighted the anti-Islamic stance of nationalism and stressed its affiliation with atheism, secularism, and communism. Da’wah was defined in terms of the revival of pure Islam. This stance was adopted by countries likeSaudi ArabiaandLibya, which considered da’wah an important duty of the state and established da’wah networks throughout the Muslim world.
Saudi Arabiaestablished an Islamic University inMedinain 1961 for the education and training of da’wah workers. In 1962 the Muslim World League (Rabitat al`Alam al-Islam!) was founded to organize various transnational da`wah activities. The league with its sixty members had as its first goal the fusion of the differing schools of thought in Islamic ideology into one organization. It succeeded very early in bringing together various reformist da’wah groups inIndia,Pakistan,Morocco, andSaudi Arabia. With more than twenty-two branches all over the world, the league continued to work independently on the international level even after the foundation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1970. Its activities were extended: Islamic Councils for the five continents were founded in 1974, the World Council of Mosques in 1975, and an Academy for Islamic Law in 1976.
In Egypta Higher Council for Islamic Affairs, established in 196o, sponsored da’wah activities. The council sent teachers to various parts of the Muslim world, particularlyAfrica, and conducted an impressive program of publication. In the 1970s the Muslim World League made an effort to coordinate its da’wah activities with the governments ofEgyptand other countries. A World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) was formed in 1972. Some countries felt that t he league’s da’wah activities and those of its subordinate organizations were guided largely by Saudi interests, and so they founded their own da’wah organizations.Libyacreated its Association of Islamic Da’wah in 1972, andIranestablished the Islamic Information Organization in 1979. [See Muslim World League.]
The political orientation of da’wah has yielded two diametrically opposed results-transnationalism and solidification of the nation-state. First, it has promoted a transnational consciousness of the larger Islamic community (ummah) among Muslims. Second, da’wah organized by a particular state, even on the transnational level, has tended to instill the idea of the nation-state among Muslims, despite the professed objectives of the da’wah ideologies to the contrary. The emphasis of da`wah organizations on the islamization of laws and societies also reinforces the concept of the nation-state. Da`wah groups normally define Muslims as a nation and do not accept other elements of the definition of a modern state; yet their demands for islamization within existing governments amount to acceptance of the idea of territorial boundaries. Further, various Muslim states that support da’wah activities control these activities as nation-states and reach out to other Muslim states.
Four modes of desirable political operation may be discerned in the modern da’wah literature: the launching of movements for an alternate political system; lobbying for an Islamic system; infiltration of da’wah into the current political system; and opposition to political orders seen as un-Islamic. Da’wah movements have sought to gain the support of some political parties for their objectives; indeed, some parties in Muslim countries have originated from da’wah movements.
Interiorization. Instead of reaching out to members of other faiths, the modern da’wah movements work primarily among Muslims. Two factors explain this emphasis. First, the threat of materialism, secularism, and indifference to religion in general and to Islam in particular, have prompted preachers to give disbelief (kufr) among Muslims priority. Modern education, science and technology, and modern political systems all pose an immediate threat to religion and its institutions.
Second, da’wah workers see in the modern governments of Muslim countries a continuity of the Christian and Western rule of the colonial period. Muslim thinkers had developed the conviction during colonial rule that state and governmental institutions were the only instruments that could bring about the revival of Islam. The struggle continues after independence as well, and the result has been not only the politicization of da’wah but also the preferential targeting of Muslim governments and societies.
The justification for the interiorization of da’wah is sought in the doctrine of al-amr bi-al-ma’ruf, the Qur’anic injunction to do good, defined as a distinct duty of the Muslim ummah. This duty is understood to aim at all humankind, but in its doctrinal details its scope is generally restricted to Muslims. Another justification is derived from the doctrine of tartib al-da’wah, (the order of priority in the spread of da’wah), an early Islamic doctrine. As explained by Ibn Amir al-Hajj (d. 1474), a Hanafi jurist, in Al-taqrir wa-al-tahbir (vol. 2,Cairo, 1898, p. 89), this doctrine has reference to Mu’a’dh ibn Jabal’s (d. 639) da’wah that stressed a graded approach in communicating religious duties and doctrines to new converts. Since there were deficient Muslims who needed to be converted to true Islam, the conversion of non-Muslims became secondary in importance.
Sa’id Hawwa in his study of Hasan al-Banna’s (d. 1949) educational philosophy (Fi dfdq al-ta’lim, 198o), explains that al-Band’ defined the priorities of da’wah in the following order: self, home, society, country, government, Muslim ummah, and world. It is worth noting that da’wah aims at the non-Muslim world only at the last stage.
Institutional Organization. Throughout the history of Islam, barring the Fatimids and Isma’ilis, da’wah was largely an individual and noninstitutionalized activity. In modern times, however, it has become increasingly institutionalized. This concept of da’wah may have arisen in response to the global Christian missionary activities that began to reach the Muslim world in the sixteenth century. The fact that organized da’wah is a recent phenomenon is attested by Thomas Arnold’s reference in The Caliphate to missionary activities in theSudan. In the early twentieth century the British government of theSudanmarked out zones of influence for various Christian missionary societies. Muslims inCairodemanded that some territories should be allotted to the followers of Islam. The government refused because no organized Muslim missionary society existed. Muhammad Rashild Rida tried to establish a school for training Muslim missionaries inIstanbulbut did not succeed until 1910.
The Syrian scholar Wahbah al-Zuhayli in Athar alharb fi-al filth al-Isldmi (Effects of War in Islamic Jurisprudence, Damascus, n.d., p. 55), and the Egyptian writer Muhammad al-Ghazali in Al-tariq min hund (The Road Starts Here, 1988, p.80) have also confirmed the absence of institutionalized da’wah in Muslim countries before the twentieth century. Subhi Salih, a modern Arab historian, discusses the history of the spread of Islam in Al-nuzum al-Islamiyah, nash’atuha wa-tatawwuruha (The Islamic Organizations, Their Rise and Development, Beirut, 1968) but does not mention such an organization. In fact, al-Ghazali’s and other modern writers’ main criticism of past Muslim governments is that they did not pay attention to da’wah on account of their narrow self-interests.
Institutionalized and organized da’wah probably began after 1915. There have been possible parallels with Christian missionary organizations; for example, the World Council of Mosques and the Organization for the
Distribution of the Qur’an are comparable to the World Council of Churches and various Bible societies.
To illustrate the institutionalized aspect of da’wah in modern times, the Da’wah Academy established in 1985 by the International Islamic University inIslamabad,Pakistan, may be mentioned. The objectives of the academy are to organize programs for the training of imams, community leaders, professionals, and workers; to develop better methods and techniques for da’wah work and the training of imams; to produce and publish literature on da’wah and to develop audio-visual material that is accurate and effective; and to organize orientation courses, symposia, seminars, workshops, and conferences. The academy publishes da’wah literature in several languages in addition to the monthly magazine Da`wah. Da’wah programs at the Academy are run at both the national and international levels. At the national level it organizes training for imams of the mosques, army officers, medical doctors, engineers, writers, teachers, journalists, and children. It runs correspondence certificate courses on Islamic law, hadith, and Islamic general knowledge, and it establishes da`wah libraries in prisons and hospitals. At the international level, the Da`wahAcademyorganizes leadership programs and training courses for new Muslims, da’wah workers, and imams inCentral Asia. The Academy is coordinating its efforts with twenty-eight other da’wah organizations in various Muslim countries, including the Muslim World League.
Social-Welfare Concerns. Until recently modern Muslim writers on Christian missionary activities strongly criticized the use of educational institutions, hospitals, and other welfare providers by the Christian missions as exploitative. Mustafa Khalidi in Al-tabshir wa-al-isti’mar fi-al-bilad al-`Arabiyah (Mission and Colonialism in the Arab World, Beirut, 1964) discusses how educational institutions and hospitals were used by the West to propagate Christianity in order to establish colonial rule. Mawlana Abu al-A’la Mawdudi, the founder of Jamd’at-i Islam! inPakistan, responding to a letter by the pope in December 1967, complained that the use of welfare institutions by the Christian missions in the Muslim world not only constituted a form of coercion to convert, but it also defeated the purpose of faith. When a missionary hospital or a school provided its welfare facilities free to converts and charged high fees to Muslims, it forced poor Muslims to convert to Christianity and at the same time contradicted the idea of sincerity in one’s faith.
The recent concern for social welfare reflects a different concept of da’wah. Traditionally, as evident in Qari Tayyib’s Usul-i da’vat-i Islam (The Principles of the Call to Islam), da’wah meant only the call to spread revealed knowledge; social welfare was beyond its scope. Muslim da’wah. organizations began to use welfare facilities for da’wah purposes only recently. The Muslim World League adopted social welfare in its da’wah programs in 1974. It began relief work for Muslims, especially refugees, in 198o, and in 1988 a World Muslim Committee for Da’wah and Relief was formed. Education and medicine are also the concerns of da’wah. movements like WAMY inSaudi Arabia, Jama`at Nasr alIslam and Ansar al-Islam inNigeria, ABIM inMalaysia, and Diwan Dawat al-Islam inIndonesia. Muslim da`wah welfare has not, however, been directed to non Muslims.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aluri, Adam `Abd Allah al-. Tdrikh al-da’wah ild Allah bayna al-ams wa-al -yawm (History of the Call to God between Yesterday and Today). 2d rev. ed.Cairo, 1979. Al-Alun, a Nigerian scholar, traces the origin of da’wah to Adam, the first prophet, and defines the term as “a call to save mankind from deviation.” He interprets wa’z (sermon), irshad (guidance), tadhkir (reminding), bisharah tabshir (good news), indhar (warning), and hisbah (moral censure) as forms of da’wah, and storytellers as types of da’is (preachers). Aluri’s conception of da’wah emerges as a broad term for the message of Islam, including its creeds, rituals, and laws. He cites recently established educational institutions as da’wah movements.
Ghalwash, Ahmad Ahmad. Al-da’wah al-Isldmiyah: Usuluha wawasd’iluha (The Islamic Mission: Principles and Problems).Cairo, 1978. Comprehensive treatment of the concept of da’wah, its doctrines, problems, and organization. The author defines da’wah as communication of the teachings of Islam, and argues that nonMuslims are the target of da’wah. In his opinion, da’wah may be performed only by trained persons, and hence training of da’wah workers is essential.
Ghitas, Husni Muhammad Ibrahim. Al-da’wah al-Isldmiyah ft `Ahd Amir al-Mu’mintn `Umar ibn al-Khattab (The Propagation of Islam in `Umar ibn al-Khattab’s Time).Beirut, 1985. Study of the spread of Islam during the rule of the second caliph, with detailed coverage of the doctrines of da’wah as discussed by jurists and commentators on the Qur’an, and its various stages in early Islamic history. Ghitas stresses that da’wah, meaning “call to Islam,” is not limited to sermons and preaching.
Jindi, Anwar al-. Afaq jadidah lil-da’wah al-Isldmiyah ft `alam alGharb (New Horizons for Islamic Mission in the Western World).Beirut, 1987. Study of da’wah as a response to various challenges from the West, in which da’wah is defined as a defense: against the Crusades, Christian missionaries, and Orientalists. According to alJindi, the target of da’wah is not conversion but a just understanding of Islam by non-Muslims. He emphasizes, however, the need for reform and unity among Muslims themselves.
Qari Muhammad Tayyib. Usal-i da’vat-i Islam (The Principles of the Call to Islam).Lahore, n.d. The author, an Indian scholar, argues that da’wah is essential to the formation of an Islamic state, but governments in Muslim countries are neglecting this duty. He warns that secularism, that is, the declaration of a state that it does not adhere to any religion, is detrimental to Islam. He stresses that revealed knowledge alone is the subject of da’wah; rational and physical sciences, and sciences not related to divine laws, are beyond the scope of da’wah.
MUHAMMAD KHALID MASUD