international – Hybrid Learning

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

Batoota — Sun, 25 May 2014 15:21:12 +0000

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY. Muslim writers argue that the international and diplomatic realms are incorporated in the very comprehensiveness of Islam, and analogues to the concepts of international relations exist in Islamic history. The Prophet’s compacts with the Medinans (623624) as well as with the Jews and Christians of the Arabian Peninsula (e.g., in Najran and `Aqabah) are presented as examples of treaties, and the despatch of envoys to the rulers of Abyssinia, Byzantium, Egypt, and Persia are regarded as evidence of early Islamic diplomatic practice. Despite the assumption that jihad against infidels or the unfaithful is an unremitting obligation, the Prophet’s agreement with the Meccans in 628, the Hudaybiyah treaty, has become the prototype of a truce (though not lasting peace) between combatants. Following this precedent, the fifth Umayyad caliph, `Abd al-Malik (r. 685-705) concluded a truce with the Byzantine ruler and even paid tribute to him in the interest of securing one flank in order to turn against Muslim rebels on the other flank.
Since the time of Caliph Harm al-Rashid (r. 7868o9), the `Abbasids routinely concluded treaties with foreigners for a number of reasons-in particular, in order to ransom their prisoners of war. They also regularly and lavishly received foreign envoys in Baghdad as representatives of fellow sovereigns. Around the year Boo, for example, Caliph Harm received an ambassador from Charlemagne and sent one in return to Aix-laChapelle. Even during the Crusades, there were several formal treaties with Christian princes, such as the agreement in 1192 between Saladin (Salah al-Din, r. 1186-1193) and the English king Richard I, which facilitated Christian pilgrimage to the Holy Land.
The Politics of Conflict and Competition. Polemicists often disregard this early history and later events and conclude that Islam is preeminently concerned with the creation of a universal Muslim community and is intolerant of those who are not Muslims. The Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet (hadiths) have many references to the need and desirability of fighting the unbelievers, often to the bitter end. This is one dimension of the jihad which is especially emphasized in the case of polytheists: the Qur’an urges the believers to fight them “wherever you find them” until they repent or are defeated (surah 9-5), and a h adith records the Prophet as saying, “I am ordered to fight until they [the polytheists] say `there is no God but Allah.’ ” Ahl alkitdb (“People of the Book”), other monotheists such as Jews or Christians, are also to be fought until they pay a special tax and are “subdued” or “humbled” (9.29). Generally, the hadiths tell us that “whoever fights to make Allah’s Word superior fights in God’s cause,” and that even a single journey for this purpose is “better than the world and all that is in it.”
This expansionist zeal accounts for the `Abbasid elaboration of a bifurcated and conflict-ridden world-dar al-Islam (the Islamic realm of peace) and dar al-barb (the non-Islamic realm bf war). Moreover, within the realm of Islam, non-Muslims who pay jizyah (tax) in exchange for protection are to suffer certain disadvantages and are not to be treated equally with Muslim citizens. For example, they are not allowed to display their religious symbols openly or to carry arms-the former condition applied to non-Muslim Western military forces stationed in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf crisis of 199o-1991. [See Dar al-Islam; Dar al-Harb; Jizyah.]
Yet it would be facile to conclude that a built-in antipathy exists between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. One reason why such a conclusion is doubtful is that Islamic political theory is more complex than that outlined above. Rather, the scriptural sources also articulate a view that is at odds with the image of jihad as an instrument of Islamic militancy and expansionism. This alternative view is of a tolerant, nonviolent Islam that accommodates itself to the reality of political pluralism and non-Muslim centers of power. Indeed, there is to be no compulsion in religion (Qur’an 2.256). It is important for Muslims to commit their wealth and very lives (61.11) to “strive” ceaselessly against falsehood, but combat constitutes the lesser form of “striving” (ji-had, literally) and should be avoided if at all possible. Rather than relying on the sword, Muslims are to use their hearts, tongues, and hands for the good of their own souls (29.6) and to build the just society. Fighting is enjoined primarily for self-defense: “Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not be aggressive, for God does not love aggressors” (2.190). Muslims may even, in certain circumstances, conclude a treaty with the enemy, which would take precedence over any obligations to fellow Muslims: “If they [Muslims] ask for help in the matter of religion, it is your duty to help them, except against a people with whom you have a treaty” (8.72).
The assumption of inherent conflict between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds also ignores a variegated pattern of war and alliance, competition and cooperation, across the Islamic centuries. Although they may not have conceded that Western states were equal to them, Muslim states regularly entered into territorial agreements and concluded peace, as in an Ottoman treaty with Russia in 1739. In the sixteenth century, Muslim practice closed the earlier debates among Muslim jurists as to the length of a truce between Muslims and non-Muslims. Invoking the Hudaybiyah treaty, jurists of at least two legal schools argued that such agreements could last no more than ten years. But the treaty of 1535 between the Ottoman ruler Suleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566) and Francis I of France endorsed the idea of “valid and sure peace” between them for their lifetimes, and from this point historical experience redefined the theoretical approach.
Compatibility of Islam and Nationalism. It is undeniably true that Islamic political theory places substantial emphasis on the idea of worldwide community. There is no distinction among the believers except in piety (Qur’an 49.13), and the fraternity of the faith will inevitably extend to incorporate all peoples. Other bonds of loyalty, such as to tribe or race, must be replaced by common submission to the one God, and as the influential Indian/Pakistani writer Abu al-A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979) maintained, the Islamic community (ummah) can only be “universal and all-embracing, its sphere of activity . . . coextensive with the whole of human life” (Political Theory of Islam, Lahore, 1960, p. 26). Yet one can also point to indicators of an Islam that recognizes; implicitly and explicitly, ideological, political, and territorial divisions. One reading of the Qur’an, for instance, seems to sanction such divisions. It says that God divided men into nations and tribes for a purpose-to come to “know each other” (49.13}-and the divisions of language and color “are signs for those who know” (30.22). At another point, the Qur’an says, “If God had so willed, He would have made them one community” (42.8).
The texts of the various schools of law also accept territorial divisions to which the law must bend (such as when dividing the spoils of war), and medieval thinkers came to accept that there was pluralism within the Islamic realm as well as between it and the non-Islamic realm. Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), for example, raised the possibility that caliphs owed their position to decisive, noncaliphal centers of power. Ibn Taymiyah (12631328) went further in stressing that because of Islam’s essential religious unity, it need not have only one political regime, and Ibn Khaldun (1333-1406) endorsed the idea of pluralism by arguing that the rise and decline of political units is natural and in accord with the divine plan.
Parallel to this intellectual adaptation is the flexibility that Muslim statesmen have displayed over the centuries. In addition to maintaining regular diplomatic relations with non-Muslims, Muslims have come to accept the reality of separate sources of power within the Islamic ummah itself. An early example is the dispute between `All (c.600-661), the Prophet’s son-in-law and the fourth caliph, and Mu’awiyah (c.602-680), the governor of Syria and later the first Umayyad caliph, over legitimate succession to the caliphate. The text of the arbitration between them is remarkable for the way it rendered the two equal, and territorially based, sovereigns.
Subsequent Islamic history confirms this tendency of the Muslim sovereign to concede that other, nominally subject, rulers possessed commensurate or superior power. The Sunni Ottomans were unable to force the submission of the Persian Shi’ah, but in 1590, the two concluded a treaty whereby the Persians agreed to stop cursing the first three caliphs and to cede large amounts of territory to the Ottomans. It was a religious and territorial compromise that Shah ‘Abbas (r. 1588-1629) felt that he had to make if he was to prevent the Uzbeks from moving into his empire from the east.
In the twentieth century, Muslim-Western relations and inter-Muslim relations came indisputably to be measured by the yardstick of territorial and national sovereignty. From the end of the eighteenth century onward, European colonialism had implanted itself, in turn fostering the growth of indigenous nationalisms. Local elites realized that they needed to rid themselves of imperial control, while simultaneously protecting their own prestige and power against rival claimants to postcolonial leadership. They recognized that, to achieve both goals, they had to play by the rules of the international game. Playing this game first involved securing recognition from the great powers, then enhancing the sense of national uniqueness in the greater society of nation-states.
In inter-Muslim relations, the norm roughly from the 1930s to today has been to acknowledge the spiritual and cultural unity of the faith while insisting on preserving the reality of territorial divisions. Most bilateral agreements and every multilateral one make clear that the form of association contracted must not be seen as a derogation or qualification of the individual sovereignties of the contracting parties. The Arab League Pact (1945), although “desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab states” (Preamble), is committed to preserving the independence and sovereignty of its members (Article 2) and requires that “each member state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states and regard them as the exclusive concerns of those states” (Article 8). The Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC, 1972) unambiguously affirms that the organization is based on the principles of “respect of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each member State” (Article 2b) and of “abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity, national unity or political independence of any member State” (Preamble).
Many Muslims, such as Mawdudi, however, have rejected the institution of the nation-state as alien and destructive of pan-Islamic union. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) was the most notable recent exponent of this view, and Principle 11 of revolutionary Iran’s constitution commits the government to promoting Islamic unity. Yet for all his wider aspirations, Khomeini implicitly accepted the legitimacy of the territorial state of Iran when it was under attack by the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). In effect, Iran was validated as the vanguard of the Islamic Revolution. The demands of political and economic intercourse, the development of an intellectual and pragmatic consensus, even if unenthusiastically so, and the pervasive influence of modern, nationalized educational systems have combined to make nationalism and the nation-state a powerful presence on the modern Muslim landscape.
Transnationalism of Islam. Political Islam is clearly an international phenomenon, but as international politics has become more complex and is now more accurately described by the concept of world politics, so too Islam is more than simply international. This is demonstrated by the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood (alIkhwan al-Muslimun), which, although rooted in individual countries, operates simultaneously in Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, even South Asia, among other countries-and exhibits some degree of linkage among them. The Muslim Brotherhood is a nonstate actor, operating in the state environment and exercising an impact on the state system. [See Muslim Brotherhood.]
Nonstate actors are an increasingly prominent aspect of modern Islamic life, particularly in the field of da’wah (the “call” to Islam). Such organizations as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, but also the Palestinian Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah, the Islamic Resistance Movement), are involved in providing a range of social welfare activities through such institutions as health clinics, schools, and housing cooperatives, which by their very efficiency and popularity provide a powerful challenge to the legitimacy of state institutions. Although their bases are securely located in their own national territories, there is no doubt that assistance in the training of activists, significant funding, and intellectual stimulation are derived from external sources.
Governments often seek to channel popular Muslim sentiments by sponsoring their own da’wah organizations. The Islamic Propagation Office in Iran is concerned with various dimensions of the export of the Iranian revolutionary message, but like its counterpart in Libya, the Islamic Call Society (Jam’iyat al-Da’wah alIslamiyah), the degree of success can be overstated. The Saudi government, with its sponsorship of the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-`Alam al-Islami), has been more successful in facilitating the spread of a nonrevolutionary but nonetheless assertive strain of Islamic activism. Through such journals as Al-rabitah (The League; English edition: journal of the Muslim World League) and Al-nahdah (The Renaissance, the journal of the allied Regional Islamic Da’wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific), transnational da’wah groups provide a potent communications and information network. Such a network encourages the mobilization of Muslim opinion on broader, Pan-Islamic issues, such as the jihad against the Soviet authorities in Afghanistan, the plight of Muslim minorities in places such as the Philippines and Bulgaria, and the future of Muslim Bosnia in the former Yugoslavian federation. [See Islamic Call Society; Muslim World League; Regional Islamic Da’wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific.]
The Islamic transnational network was also instrumental in generating and sustaining the negative reaction to the publication in 1988 of Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses, which was widely regarded as blasphemous of the prophet Muhammad. Britain and Iran broke off diplomatic relations over the affair and the European Community and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) put it near the top of their agendas. But in addition to these foreign policy results, the Rushdie affair generated more complicated politics.
One of the distinctive features of the Rushdie affair was the replication of Saudi-Iranian rivalry on British soil. The Union of Muslim Organizations and the Islamic Cultural Centre in London were instrumental in the early stages in bringing Muslim objections to the book to the attention of the government and public. Although these groups fall under Saudi patronage, the South Asian Jama’at-i Islam! was also important in mobilizing the Islamic Foundation in Leicester to the cause. However, with the Ayatollah’s fatwd (edict) against Rushdie in February 1989 amounting to a death sentence, the situation changed rapidly. The Saudis and their supporters in Britain appeared to become defensive, and Iranian-inspired groups, such as the Muslim Institute, grew vociferous in their attacks on Rushdie, the British government, and Saudi Arabia.
The vast majority of British Muslims were not as directly concerned with the Saudi-Iranian competition. But other rivalries were of consequence, mainly those between Barelwis, who follow holy men (pirs) and are mystical in orientation but not entirely adverse to political activity, and Deobandis, who tend toward scripturalism in spiritual matters and apoliticism in worldly matters. Deobandis have been especially adept at disseminating their message of inner reform, owing largely to the Jama’at Tabligh, a singularly devoted missionary movement with branches in many countries.
Partly because of the lack of full assimilation into British economic, social, and political life, and linguistic pluralism and ethnic rivalries (for example, among Mirpuris, Pathans, Bangladeshis, and Gujaratis), there is both a built-in competitiveness in British Muslim communities, reflected in identifiably sectarian mosques and schools, and a susceptibility to outside influences. These latter include pirs, Barelwi or Deobandi `ulama’, the Jama`at Tabligh, and Jama’at-i Islami from the Indian subcontinent. To a considerable extent, therefore, the politics of British Muslims, particularly during the Rushdie affair, has reflected the Pakistani or Indian politics of Islam. Correspondingly, the reactions of Muslim groups in Britain and their support for the fatwa had an impact on the factionalized politics of Iran. [See Barelwis; Deobandis; Tablighi Jama’at; Jama’at-i Islami; Rushdie Affair.]
The ability of Muslims to live within national frontiers in the modern world and, at the same time, the presence of Islamic concerns in both domestic and foreign policy suggest that the vast majority of Muslims are seeking-for the foreseeable future-to create Muslim states, not to supplant the nation-state system itself. Pan-Islamic aspirations have not disappeared, certainly, and the ability of Muslim transnational organizations, ideologies, and communications to permeate national borders testifies that a greater degree of Muslim community is now apparent. One London-based Islamist has spoken of the need of British Muslims to “plug into the global grid of the power of Islam” (Kalim Siddiqui, speech on “Generating Power without Politics,” 14 July 1990), and concretization of the ummah is indeed emerging in various ways. But as the simultaneous acceptance of territorial and political pluralism and the manifold differences of policy and conviction among Muslim states, nonstate actors, and movements indicated, Pan-Islamic political integration remains limited. International and transnational relations are thus likely to continue to evolve not only between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, but within the Islamic realm itself.
[See also Da`wah, article on Institutionalization; Diplomatic Immunity; Diplomatic Missions; Human Rights; International Law; Nation; Organization of the Islamic Conference; Pan-Islam; Ummah.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AbuSulayman, `AbdulHamid A. The Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought.
Herndon, Va., 1987. Lucid analysis by modernist Muslim writer on the Islamic framework of diplomacy and interstate relations. Abu Zahrah, Muhammad. Al-`alaqat al-duwaliyah ft al-Islam (International Relations in Islam). Cairo, 1964. Study of how Islamic norms have allowed Muslim states to engage in a fully functioning international practice.
al-Ahsan, Abdullah. Ummah or Nation? Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society. Leicester, 1992. Expert on the Organization of the Islamic Conference calls for the strengthening of Muslim identification with the ummah and the consequent enhancement of the OIC.
Dawisha, Adeed, ed. Islam in Foreign Policy. Cambridge, 1983. Valuable as a unique study of the roles that Islam plays in the foreign policy of several Muslim countries.
Djalili, Muhammad-Reza. Diplomatie islamique: Strattgie internationale du khomeynisme. Paris, 1989. Informed analysis of the international ideas and practice of the revolutionary regime in Iran.
Hamidullah, Muhammad. Muslim Conduct of State. 4th rev. ed. Lahore, 1961. One of the standard expositions on Islam’s compatibility with the norms of the international system.
Hurewitz, J. C., ed. The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record. 2 vols. 2d ed. New Haven and London, 1975. Indispensable collection of treaties and other documents that present the record of Muslims’ adaptation to prevailing international practice in their relations with both non-Muslims and fellow Muslims.
Iqbal, Afzal. Diplomacy in Islam. Lahore, 1977. Study of the Prophet’s diplomatic practice.
Khadduri, Majid. War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore and London, 1955. Classic work on the theory of Islamic international law and international relations.
Landau, Jacob. The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization. Oxford and New York, 1990), The best study of how Pan-Islam emerged in the context of the transition from the imperial to the national age in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Moinuddin, Hasan. The Charter of the Islamic Conference: The Legal and Economic Framework. Oxford, 1987. Detailed study of the structure of the OIC, placed in a larger discussion of Islamic ideas on international law and cooperation.
Proctor, J. Harris, ed. Islam and International Relations. London, 1965. An early examination of many of the enduring issues, such as nationalism and Pan-Islam, by eminent scholars.
Rajaee, Farhang. Islamic Values and World View: Khomeyni on Man, the State and International Politics. Lanham, Md., and London, 1983. Particularly insightful study of Khomeinist international thought written by a student of both Islamic political thought and international relations theory.
Saleem, Musa. The Muslims and the New World Order. London, 1993 Deals with a broad range of subjects, but last quarter of book directly deals with such matters as relations between rich and poor countries (including within the Islamic world) and such contemporary problems as Bosnia and Kashmir.
Schulze, Reinhard. Islamischer Internationalismus im 2o. Jahrundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Islamischen Weltliga. Leiden, 1990), Excellent study of “international” Islam, particularly the activities of the Saudi-backed Muslim World League.
Siddiqui, Kalim. Beyond the Muslim Nation-State. London, 1980. Vigorous attack on the idea of Muslim national pluralism by a leading
British Muslim who, more recently, has become the leading figure in “the Muslim Parliament” in Britain.
JAMES P. PISCATORI

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Batoota — Thu, 22 May 2014 16:08:55 +0000

INTERNATIONAL LAW. The expansion of Islam, territorial conquests, and the progressive formation of a Muslim empire that had its apogee between the eighth and ninth centuries led Muslim jurists to formulate a certain number of rules and standards that can be described as principles in the domain of international law. The primary sources of this law, and indeed of all shari’ah (the divine law), are the Qur’an and the sunnah (words and acts attributed to the Prophet). Secondary sources are essentially of two kinds: the consensus of the majority of the jurists (ijma`) and analogy (qiyas). The oldest Muslim code of law which refers to the siyar, or rules governing war and peace with non-Muslims, is probably the Kitab al-majmu` of Zayd ibn ‘Ali (d. 738). Other jurists, such as Abu Yusuf, al-Awza`i, Malik ibn Anas, al-Waqidi, and particularly al-Shafi’i, followed his example, devoting a portion of their works to questions relating to the law which today would be called international law. The great jurist Sarakhs! (d. 1090) wrote a lengthy commentary on those writings of al-Shafi`i that dealt with siyar.
At first, Muslim conquerors progressed very rapidly and undoubtedly believed that Islam would spread quickly throughout the entire world. Given this vision, the nature and form of eventual relationships with foreign powers were of little importance. However, from the ninth century onward, the conquerors’ aim seemed increasingly unrealizable, and Islamic rulers were forced to accept the division of the world into two distinct realms: Islam and non-Islam. The acknowledgment of this division produced one of the founding principles of Islamic law. According to this vision, the world is divided into two territories: dar al-Islam (“realm of Islam”), where divine law governs, and dar al-barb (“realm of war”), which temporarily evades the law of God, but which should be made to submit when the appropriate time comes.
Dar al-Islam is the ultimate Muslim realm, where the precepts of the true faith reign. In theory, dar al-Islam constitutes a group of unified territories, forming a single state, ruled by a single power and subject to the law of the one God. The substantial unity of dar al-Islam partakes as well of the universal and messianic character of the Islamic state. In fact, the legal concept of Islamic power rests on the direct continuation of religious belief and seeks the reunification of all men under the aegis of Islam. Thus, unlike modern international law, which recognizes the existence of a multitude of sovereign states, traditional Islamic law, like Roman law or the legal system of medieval Christendom, is based on the theory of the universal state.
The concept of dar al-Islam is linked to another notion fundamental to the Islamic vision, that of ummah, or the community of the faithful. According to Islam, it is religion that determines citizenship and not parentage or birthplace. According to this view, a Muslim who is in Islamic territory, even if far from his birthplace, can, if he is capable, fill any post, including political office. However, the idea of the ummah goes beyond the territory of Islam, in that there might be Muslim minorities who live outside of the dar al-Islam. Furthermore, nonMuslim religious communities can live in the heart of the Muslim world as protected minorities (dhimmis) if they belong to the “people of the book” (ahl al-kitdb), Jews, Christians, or members of other scriptural religions. Dhimmis must pay a special tax (jizyah) and do not enjoy full civil rights. However, the government gives them protection and recognizes their right to govern themselves according to the conventions of their own community.
According to Muslim jurists, dar al-Islam and the rest of the world are in a state of war which will endure until Islam’s eventual triumph over unbelief. This situation is justified by the existence in the Qur’an of the notion of jihad, often incorrectly translated as “holy war.” Literally, jihad means “effort,” “endeavor,” or “struggle,” but in effect it implies the execution of an order from God enjoining Muslims to fight against the infidels in order to effect their conversion or their submission. However, jihdd is not one of the five pillars of Islam. It is not a strict individual obligation, but a communal duty necessary to the defense and spread of Islamhence the importance of the community’s political/religious leaders in the call to jihad.
The Qur’an repeatedly alludes to the duty to fight infidels, while also referring to the necessity for the war to be legally sanctioned and for its conduct to be lawful. Furthermore, many verses of the Qur’an seem to characterize jihdd as a defensive endeavor. However, there is a greater number of verses that urge armed struggle and make no distinction between offensive and defensive war. Be that as it may, the complex nature of the concept of jihad authorizes diverse interpretations. Thus, Muslim authors have offered varying and sometimes contradictory explications of it. Certain modernist and reformist nineteenth- and twentieth-century jurists have maintained that jihad should be understood in a spiritual rather than a military sense. Although this type of argument cannot be summarily dismissed, it must however be acknowledged that throughout history jihad has often signified the making of war. It must not be automatically concluded from this that Islam is a warlike religion. The concept of a just war is not unique to Islam, and in addition, Islamic law has elaborated rules helping to bring together Muslim countries with the non-Islamic world.
From the time when Muslims had to resign themselves to accepting the impossibility of the rapid realization of their ideal, that is, the foundation of a universal Islamic state, even if the state of war was maintained from a theoretical point of view, a new conceptual framework was necessary. With this aim in mind, some jurists recognized the existence of a third category of territories between dar al-Islam and dar al-barb: dar al`ahd (“land of the covenant”) or dar al-sulh (“land of truce”). In order not to clash with the fundamental principles of Islamic law, it was necessary to resort to a legal subterfuge (transformation of the non-Muslim state into a state that recognized Muslim suzerainty), while emphasizing the temporary aspect of the concept of dar al-`ahd. From that point onward, various standards of peaceful relations were introduced, such as the principle of exchanging diplomatic missions. Until the end of the eighteenth century, Muslim sovereigns had not established permanent foreign embassies, but they often sent envoys on missions into neighboring countries and also received ambassadors from non-Muslim countries. In principle these delegations enjoyed diplomatic immunity, but there were occasions when one side or the other did not carefully respect this immunity.
The contacts between the Muslim world and the exterior world were also favored by the institution of aman, which is a safe-conduct guarantee granted to a nonMuslim by the government or even by an individual, authorizing travel in Muslim territory and yet exempting the traveler from restrictions imposed on dhimmis. Amdn can be extended to a group of people, and even to all citizens of a foreign country. In addition, Muslim sovereigns accepted rather quickly the signing of treaties with ddr al-barb countries, as well as the use of arbitration to resolve certain conflicts. The duration of treaties, however, was in principle limited. With arbitration, the cases submitted to this peaceful method of resolving disputes were more often technical than political.
The dualistic worldview, favored by Islam, and the hazards of history, were the bases for a certain number of rules of international law that until the mid nineteenth century governed relations with the nonMuslim world. But this conceptualization assumes the unity of the Muslim world, whereas that world was divided into several parts. At the very time when the boundaries between Islam and non-Islam were established, differences in administrative and even legal practices between the various provinces were becoming more marked. Parallel to this development, and especially after the disappearance of the first Arab empire of the Umayyads (661-750), there were revolts and uprisings in surrounding regions. With the weakening of the ‘Abbasid Empire (749-1258) and its progressive disintegration, autonomous principalities appeared. It was thus that independent dynasties trying to strengthen their authority and extend their territorial base emerged in all corners of the Muslim world. In the Mashriq (Arab East), the dismantling of the empire was followed by Turko-Mongolian invasions. Once islamized, the Turko-Mongolians in their turn founded new states. The end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth were marked by the formation of the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire in Persia, and the Mughal Empire in India. The founding of these new states, and above all the rivalries that grew up between them, introduced new elements of division in the heart of the Muslim world.
When all of these historical events are considered, it seems irrefutable that Islam was more distinguished by territorial pluralism over the course of centuries than by territorial unity, even if juridical fiction masked the reality of power relationships and of antagonisms between various political polities that shared the space of dar alIsldm. In reality, although only one single border was supposed to separate the Islamic world from the rest of the world, other demarcations developed which divided Muslim countries from one another. In practice, these administrative divisions, which were not meant to separate the faithful, effectively became boundaries between states. Thus, in the seventeenth century, Persians and Ottomans introduced the practice of drawing up treaties of precise delimitation of the borders between Muslim states. It was in this manner that the rules of Islamic international law, which originally had been applied to relations with non-Muslim states, were progressively extended, with some modifications, to the relations between Muslim states. However, official recognition of this extension was avoided by referring to the intrinsic unity of Islam and the Islamic world. With this aim in mind, each Muslim sovereign made a point to present himself more as a defender of Islam than as a prince holding sway over a clearly demarcated Muslim territory.
In the nineteenth century, siyar underwent internal transformations because of the fragmentation of the Muslim world, and changes in the practice of international law by Muslim states were added. These changes were the result of the intensification of relations with Europeans and the preeminence that Europe would henceforth take in international life. Two phenomena helped to introduce European notions of law into the Muslim milieu: colonial expansion, which either directly or indirectly affected most Muslim countries; and the increased involvement of some Muslim states, such as the Ottoman Empire, and to a lesser extent Persia, in the cooperative interplay of European nations. Concepts such as the state, national territory, sovereignty, borders, and the organization of international relations were from this time on seen in a new light. Later, decolonization and the recognition of the states’ rights to their own natural resources contributed to the emergence in the Muslim world of fully independent states. These states wanted to be equal and thus similar to the other states of an international system born of the historical experience of the West and of the European tradition of international law.
The movement toward an international community founded on the concept of the plurality of states forced the Islamic theory of international law to undergo important transformations. Among these modifications the most significant are: the acceptance of the principle of peaceful relations and the renunciation of the principle of the state of war advocated by jihad; the acceptance of the idea of separation between religious doctrine and foreign affairs; and the explicit recognition of territorial sovereignty. Thus changes that began in the ninth century developed in the sixteenth within the Muslim world and intensified following the expansion of contacts with Europe, radically altered the very foundations of the Islamic concept of international law.
Although it can be said that at the end of the twentieth century the Islamic legal system and Western international law have moved closer together in an unprecedented fashion, one must not conclude that the classical concept of Islam has been totally lost in these matters. It is true that the idea of Islamic solidarity is largely a myth, yet it still endures in the minds of many Muslims. In fact, the traditional vision underlies certain actions of Muslim states and is at the root of certain contemporaneous doctrines. With regard to the desire for unity, for example, the creation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1972, which brings together almost fifty Muslim countries, is obvious proof of a desire among Muslims for convergence. Admittedly, this entirely conventional intergovernmental structure has nothing in common with the creation of a great Islamic state, but it is, however, the only modern international organization created by specific reference to a religion.
Contemporary doctrines involve the fundamentalist discourse on international relations. The fundamentalists follow classical theory, on the fine hand rejecting all modifications which that theory has undergone over time, and on the other hand infusing it with modern, anti-imperialist, Third World revolutionary jargon. They demand simultaneously the strengthening of the faith within the community, unity in that community, and the expansion of the boundaries of dar al-Islam. From their point of view, Islam has today, more than ever, a moral mission in the universal scheme, and not to accomplish that mission would constitute a renunciation of the very foundations of Islam.
Since the institution in 1979 of an Islamic republic in Iran, the revolutionary Islamists have for the first time had the opportunity to put into practice their ideas about international law. They have consistently challenged the standards which govern modern international relations, not hesitating to resort to unanimously condemned acts, such as taking hostage American diplomatic personnel, condemning a British novelist to death for blasphemy, and rejecting human rights as a secular concept of the Judeo-Christian tradition. However, they have rarely hesitated to use all of the resources of that same international law when it suited their interests. With time, noticing the counterproductivity of some of their decisions, the Islamists in power in Iran have tried to conform to the habits and customs of present-day international relations. Nevertheless, their ideological position remains fundamentally unchanged, and they still do not recognize any legal tradition other than the most conservative Islamic one.
[See also Dar al-Harb; Dar al-Islam; Dar al-$ulh; Diplomatic Immunity; Diplomatic Missions; International Relations and Diplomacy; Jihad; and Law, article on Legal Thought and jurisprudence.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Artz, Donna E. “The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States.” Human Rights Quarterly 12 (May 1990): 202-230.
Bahar, Sarvenaz. “Khomeinism, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and International Law: The Relevance of Islamic Political Ideology.” Harvard International Law Journal 33.1 (Winter 1992): 145-190. Djalili, Mohammad-Reza. Diplomatie islamique: Strategie internationale du khomeynisme. Paris, 1989.
Khadduri, Majid. War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore, 1955 A classic work on the subject.
Lewis, Bernard. The Political Language of Islam. Chicago and London, 1988. A systematic study on the relationship of Islam and politics.
Mahmasanl, Subhi. “The Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine.” Recueil de Cours 117 (1966): 201-328. Piscatori, J. P. Islam in a World of Nation-States. Cambridge, 1986. One of the best works on the territorial pluralism of Islam.
Rechid Ahmed. “L’Islam et le droit des gens.” Recueil des Cours 62 (1937) 375-5o6. Although old, a still interesting text.
Reisman, M. H. A. “Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Impact on International Law and Politics.” In The Influence of Religion on the Development of International Law, edited by Mark W. Janis, pp. 107-134. Dordrecht, 1991. A stimulating comparison of the views of several religions.
MOHAMMAD-REZA DJALILI
Translated from French by Elizabeth Keller

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY AT KUALA LUMPUR

Batoota — Fri, 16 May 2014 09:17:49 +0000

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY AT KUALA LUMPUR. Founded in 1983, the International Islamic University, Malaysia, seeks to permeate the teaching of all knowledge with Islamic values. The idea of establishing the International Islamic University (IIU) was first discussed on 12 January 1982 by the prime minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed at a meeting with the minister of education, the director general of education, and a few senior academicians. An amendment bill of the Universities and University Colleges Act of 19’71 (Laws of Malaysia) was passed by Parliament, and given the Royal Assent in February 1983. This amendment allowed the International Islamic University, Malaysia, to be established outside the restrictions of the Rules and Regulations of the Universities and University Colleges Act of 1971 and to become international in nature with international cosponsorship and with ownership vested in a Board of Governors. The University is presently cosponsored by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and seven other Muslim countries in addition to Malaysia: Maldives, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

The university’s objectives, among others, are:
To re-establish, with Allah’s help, the primacy of Islam in all fields of knowledge consistent with the Islamic tradition of the pursuit of knowledge and truth, as reflected by those pioneering works of early Islamic scholars and thinkers that began with the teachings of our Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).
To revive the ancient Islamic tradition of learning where knowledge was propagated and sought after in the spirit of submission to God (Tawhid).
Its philosophy of the integration of religious knowledge and worldly sciences, together with the vision of Islamization of human knowledge, were inspired by the recommendations of the first World Conference on Muslim Education held in Mecca in 1977.
As such, the university is not limited to Islamic theological studies but is a comprehensive professional institution of higher learning in which the teaching of all fields of knowledge is infused with Islamic values and the Islamic philosophy of knowledge. When it opened in 1983 with 153 students, it had two faculties, Laws and Economics, offering undergraduate degrees and two services centers, the Centre for Fundamental Knowledge and the Centre for Languages.
Dr. Abdul Rauf of Egypt served as rector for the first five years. In 1989 Dr. AbdulHamid A. AbuSulayman, former president of the International Institute of Islamic Thought in Washington, D.C., was appointed rector. With the support of the president of IIU, Anwar Ibrahim, who was then minister of education, he established a new faculty under the name of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences and departments covering Islamic studies, most of the social sciences, and the humanities. He also introduced the full credit-hour system in July 1990. Under this system, the class size has been kept small (averaging thirty-five students per class) to enable a more creative interaction between the instructor and students. Evaluation of the academic performance of students is based on regular tests and assignments, midterm examinations, and end-of-semester examinations. Students evaluate the academic staff at the end of each semester through the teacher efficiency rating system.
As of July 1992, the university offers a choice of undergraduate courses in law, business, accounting, economics, psychology, political science, history and civilization, philosophy, mass communications, English as a second language, Arabic as a second language, Islamic revealed knowledge and heritage, and sociology/anthropology. There are also masters and diploma courses available in various areas of Education as well as in English and Arabic as Second Languages. Masters’ programs are offered in library and information science, economics, and revealed knowledge and heritage. The Faculty of Laws offers programs leading up to the Ph.D level. The university is expanding postgraduate courses to cover all disciplines available in its undergraduate program in order to develop the intellectual Islamic capacity of the students.
The next phase in the development of the university’s undergraduate academic programs will see the establishment of the Faculty of Engineering, which will open in 1994, followed by one in architecture and one in the applied and basic sciences in 1995. The university also plans to establish a medical school, covering all the medical sciences including dentistry and nursing in Kuantan, Pahang, by 1998.
The original student body of 153 students grew to more than six thousand students in January 1992
3,071 undergraduate and 2,461 matriculation (pre-university) students. Postgraduate students now number 848 with 419 of this number enrolled in the Diploma of Education program. The university plans to increase gradually the number of international students to approximately 25 percent of the total student population. By July 1995, IIU will move to its permanent campus in Gombak, a suburb of Kuala Lumpur, which will have the capacity to accommodate a total of fourteen thousand students.
All professional courses are taught in English, but students are required to reach the level of advanced Arabic proficiency. Students taking the Shari’ah, Arabic, and Revealed Knowledge courses must, of course, take them in Arabic, but their minor courses are offered in English.
The university has introduced a unique system of “double major”: every student specializing in human and social science courses must take a minor concentration in a Revealed Knowledge discipline related to the major area of concentration. After receiving the first degree in the major discipline, it is possible for students to obtain another bachelor’s degree in the minor area if they extend their studies another two semesters into a fifth year.
The staff of the university are committed to the goal of developing young men and women who are not only aware of contemporary problems and perceive the drawbacks of both the modern and the traditional approaches, but are also able to examine issues from Islamic perspectives founded on the principle of unity of revelation and reason, matter and spirit, the here and the hereafter.
[See also Education, articles on Educational Institutions and The Islamization of Knowledge; Universities.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
International Islamic University. University Handbook 1984/85. Kuala Lumpur, 1984.
International Islamic University. University Prospectus 1985/86. Kuala Lumpur, 1985.
International Islamic University. University Campus Master Plan Report. Kuala Lumpur, 1991.
International Islamic University. Undergraduate Prospectus 1993194 Kuala Lumpur, 1993
Memorandum and Articles of Association of International Islamic University, Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
M. KAMAL HASSAN

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY AT ISLAMABAD

Batoota — Mon, 12 May 2014 10:28:19 +0000

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY AT ISLAMABAD. In the wake of the islamization policy in Pakistan, a central institution for the coordination of this policy and for higher learning, the International Islamic University at Islamabad, was established. A SharI’ah Faculty at Qa’id-i A’zam University was founded in 1979, but it could not meet the needs felt during islamization. In 198o, therefore, the Shari’ah Faculty was upgraded into an Islamic University, functioning at first as a custodian of the Faisal mosque and mainly financed by the Saudi government. By moving into the cultural complex around the mosque, it became financially solvent. After the incorporation of several institutes and academies, the university acquired the status of a full-fledged International Islamic University (IIU) in 1985.

The IIU soon became a focal point for the dissemination of Islamic thought for Muslims in Pakistan, Central and Southeast Asia, and Muslim minority areas. Explicitly open to all classes and creeds, it aims to provide an intellectual base for and guidance in the process of islamization and the development of solutions to problems arising therefrom. It hopes to bring various existing Islamic identities into one common ideological platform for joint political and religious action and to eliminate the obstacles responsible for Muslims’ schismatic differences.
This undertaking is, however, only possible with the moral and financial support of other Muslim countries and international organizations. Close academic collaboration with Egyptian, Saudi, and Malaysian governments and universities underlines the transnational character of the IIU. In 1990, cultural ties with the former Soviet Muslim Religious Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were established as well. The composition of its leadership, teaching staff, and student body reflects this implicit “ummah-ization,” which finds expression in international workshops and exchanges, scholarships, and a network of academic institutions. As an ideological body the university is formally exempt from state jurisdiction.
A conglomerate of different, already existing institutes, the IIU offers courses in Islamic law, shad `ah, Islamic economics, da’wah, usul al-din, and Arabic. These institutes are as follows:
The Faculty of Usul al-Din (general Islamic studies) The Faculty of Shari`ah, which conducts Shari`ah, courses at the national level for in-service judicial officers and public prosecutors, as well as for readers of the Friday sermons (khutbah), leaders of prayers (a’immah; sg., imdm), and teachers in religious schools (mudarrisun)
The Islamic Research Institute, in existence since 196o and merged into the Islamic University in 1980. It is the research wing, and interprets the teachings of Islam within the context of the intellectual and scientific progress of the modern world
The Institute for Social Studies, which soon became the International Institute of Islamic Economics. In its beginning stages, it is developing a body of Ph.D. graduates, with the help of the United States Agency for International Development, among others. It also organizes senior officers’ training programs
The Institute for Linguistics and Languages (Departments of Arabic and English). Arabic is taught in order to avoid the confusion and disunity in the Muslim world that arises from erroneous interpretations of the language of the Qur’an; English is considered important for transnational communication
The Institute of Da’wah and Qira’at, now the Da’wah Academy, which conducts Islamic leadership training camps for Muslims from Pakistan and other countries, (e.g., a’immah, community leaders, students, and army officers). It offers pre-university training to overseas candidates from Muslim minority countries and collaborates with the Regional Islamic Da’wah Council for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, based in Malaysia. It also conducts correspondence courses, prepares area studies and literature for children, and has established translation and media sections.
As a federal corporation, the IIU is hierarchically structured, headed by the president of Pakistan, who appoints the rector and vice-chancellor. Administratively, the IIU is governed by a Board of Trustees consisting of Muslim scholars, technocrats, and educators primarily from Pakistan, but also from the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and international Islamic organizations. All academic matters are supervised by the respective Boards of Studies and the Academic Council, which in 1992 was chaired by an Egyptian.
In 1989-1990, the ten degree programs offered by the IIU, including economics, law, comparative religion, usul al-din, Arabic, and the pre-university course at the Da’wah Academy, were accredited and recognized by the University Grants Commission. The al-Azhar University has recognized the university’s B.A. (Hons.) Usul al-Din (Islamic Studies) only. [See Azhar, al-.]
Formally, the appointment of teachers is based on merit and commitment to Islam. Nearly half of the more than three hundred teachers and researchers originate in the Middle East, primarily Egypt. The majority of native teachers are not traditional scholars but possess Ph. Ds from foreign universities. They are paid from the university budget; overseas teachers are paid by the Egyptian government, the Rabitat al-`Alam al-Islam! (Muslim World League), Saudi universities, and from income accruing from endowments.
The composition of the student body is multinational as well. In 1991, out of more than a thousand students, approximately half were Pakistanis; the rest came from more than forty countries, chiefly from Muslim minority areas, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia (China, Indonesia, Thailand), Africa (Somalia, Kenya, Sudan), and the Middle East (Jordan, Turkey). Female students comprised about 7 percent of the total. Students are selected on merit and prior qualifications, which, in some cases, includes their traditional education. Places are reserved for foreigners, students belonging to deprived areas or low-income groups, and members of the armed forces. Self-sufficient students have better chances for admission; those with limited incomes are eligible for stipends. Residence is provided to all foreign students and to most Pakistanis for a nominal fee as is free medical care and transportation. More than half of the student body receives scholarships, approximately 6o percent of which are provided from abroad. A major portion of the stipends comes from the International Islamic Charitable Foundation (Kuwait), Zakat House Kuwait, and the International Scientific, Educational, Social and Cultural Organization. The majority of students are enrolled in law and shad `ah; the next largest number study usul al-din, Arabic, and economics. Female students are enrolled in LL.B (shari’ah and law) and in usul aldin only. If students do not complete their final examinations, they must repay all scholarship money received.
Since the IIU is considered an ideological production center, the conduct of its students and teachers is subject to rigorous supervision. They must follow accurately Islamic rituals, and participation in any political action or membership in any political party is strictly prohibited. Regular conduct reports are intended to guarantee the Islamic, apolitical and nonsectarian character of the institution. The introduction of required academic dress is in preparation as well. Thus, the university can be considered a custodian of the knowledge that produces ideologically sound Muslim leadership, in line with its universalizing salafi worldview.
In this context, the use of media is most important for the dissemination of Islamic learning, and several publication units publish contributions in different languages, for example, Urdu, Arabic, and English. A central library, comprised of the libraries of the different institutes and academies that have been incorporated, has a collection of more than 150,000 volumes as well as periodicals.
The IIU receives a regular grant from the government of Pakistan and also accepts donations from trusts and endowments; all capital held by any faculty or institute has been transferred to the university. Recently, the government allocated more than 700 acres of land for the university’s permanent campus in Islamabad to meet growing demands.
[See also Universities.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
No scholarly work on the IIU exists to date. All sources used for the article are, therefore, of an official nature:
Brohi, A. K. “Islamic University of Islamabad: Principles and Purposes.” Pakistan Studies 1.2 (1982).
Government of Pakistan. Islamic University, Islamabad: Annual Report, 1982-83. Islamabad, 1984.
Government of Pakistan. Islamic University, Islamabad: Vice Chancellor’s Annual Report, 1982-83. Islamabad, 1984.
Government of Pakistan. Islamic University Calendar, 1985. Vol. 1. Islamabad, 1985.
Government of Pakistan. Islamic University Handbook, 1985-1986. Islamabad, 1985.
Government of Pakistan. International Islamic University Ordinance, 1985. Islamabad, 1985.
Government of Pakistan. Annual Report 198919o Session, International Islamic University. Islamabad, 1991 (mimeo).
“The International Islamic University.” Pakistan Times, Special Supplement, February 1992, pp. 6ff.
JAMAL. MALIK

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FEDERATION OF STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS

Batoota — Mon, 12 May 2014 10:23:22 +0000

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FEDERATION OF STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS. A worldwide organization of Muslim student associations, the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO) received its initial impetus from the experience of Muslim students in North America. In 1963, the Muslim Students Association of the United States and Canada (MSA) was established on the campus of the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana. This was a new experiment in the history of Islamic student organizations, in the sense that the student constituency in the United States came from all parts of the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. The Association provided a sense of identity to the foreign Muslim students and also gave them an opportunity to learn about Islam in a modern context. The free access to Islamic literature and to books and journalistic misrepresentations of Islam helped them to discover for themselves what the Islamic revival meant to Muslims and to those who insisted on misrepresenting it.

The American Islamic experience also created a greater global consciousness in these foreign Muslim students and provided the MSA with global links through its members and alumni. This experience was enriched further when the MSA began to attract Americans who embraced Islam. Representatives of the MSA participated in the conferences and conventions of other Muslim student organizations in different countries. In the course of these meetings, Muslim students who were becoming increasingly aware of the need to restructure Islamic thought and identity moved toward a common goal: the creation of an umbrella organization that could help in the organized promotion of concepts such as the unity of Islamic thought, the universality of the Islamic movement, and the consolidation of a mature Muslim leadership.
The plan to establish a world federation of Muslim student organizations, finally realized with the establishment of the IIFSO, was adopted at a convention held at Ibadan University, Nigeria, in July 1966; it was an allAfrican affair with representatives from Sudan, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, and Guinea. A preparatory committee was formed to mobilize ideas and resources for an international conference to be held in Sudan in December 1968.
Participation in the Sudan conference was more international; delegates of Muslim student organizations from Europe, North America, and Africa attended. The conference concluded with the adoption of an interim constitution. Three months later, in February 1969, a larger meeting was held in Mecca, during the hajj, at which delegates resolved to: reconsider the IIFSO constitution and make any appropriate amendments; make arrangements for convening the IIFSO General Constituent Assembly; and establish widespread contacts in order to introduce the IIFSO, its mission, and purpose, secure affiliation from a maximum number of student organizations, and ensure material support for the Constituent Assembly. The draft constitution was circulated among eminent Muslim thinkers who endorsed the idea and offered both support and useful suggestions.
The first inaugural conference of the IIFSO was held on 13-14 June 1969, at the Bilal Mosque in Aachen, Germany. Since then, the organization has held international conferences in several countries. Each conference has had a profound effect on the local Islamic community. A second conference was held in Aachen in 1971; the third and fourth took place in Istanbul; the fifth in Kuala Lumpur; the sixth in Khartoum; and the seventh again in Malaysia in 1988. Regional conferences have been held in South and Southeast Asia, the Caribbean region and the Pacific region, North and South America, Europe, and Africa.
The roots of the IIFSO run deep in the experience of those members who were students in the West. Most of the secretaries general have been either past presidents or active members of the MSA. Their vision of an Islamic movement that integrates the best of the Muslim world and the West has helped impart a definite character to the IIFSO.
Approaches. The IIFSO’s method is intellectual as well as practical. Combining scholarship with pragmatism, it has provided direction to various student movements and steered them toward constructive work aimed at rejuvenating Muslim thought. An important aspect of the IIFSO’s work is the provision of continuing education to its membership; thus, it sponsors and supports training camps throughout the world. In order to provide a clear direction to this activity, Dr. Hisham Altalib, a former secretary general, has published a comprehensive Training Guide for Islamic Workers. The IIFSO has also played a major role in encouraging women to take an active role in the Islamic movement. It sent women delegates to the International Women’s Conference at Nairobi, Kenya, in 1985, and its delegates played an active role in the founding of Muslim women’s organizations in Pakistan.
In the Caribbean region, the IIFSO is a significant factor in the development of private enterprise through its program of providing loans and expertise to small businessmen. It has also organized Islamic work among Spanish-speaking people in North and South America. The details of such work were refined in two international conferences held by the IIFSO in Mexico (1987) and Columbia (1988). Finally, the IIFSO has been active in providing relief and reconstruction help in places struck by natural calamities.
The IIFSO’s desire to create an independent financial base for itself has led to a new direction in Islamic publishing. Heretofore, most Islamic literature has been available only in its original language or in translation into the major traditional Muslim languages (Arabic, Farsi, Urdu). The IIFSO has made Islamic literature available in more than eighty languages. To date, it has published more than five hundred titles with ten million copies. The sale of these books has become a vital source of financing for the IIFSO’s various activities. This experience has been duplicated by several other Islamic organizations within their own jurisdictions. Several Islamic organizations, including the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), have relied heavily on IIFSO publications in building the libraries of Muslim youth organizations in different linguistic communities around the world.
This publishing venture has helped the IIFSO stay clear of fundraising activities and, at the same time, has given native speakers of many languages access to the works of several important Islamic thinkers. It is noteworthy that the IIFSO was among the pioneers that undertook translation of Islamic books, many written in English in the United States, into languages of the former Soviet Union and into Cyrillic script.
Relations with International Islamic Organizations. The IIFSO maintains close ties with other international Islamic umbrella organizations. Its secretary general is an ex-officio member of the board of trustees of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, a connection that provides a basis for mutual involvement and cooperation. Similarly, the IIFSO has close relations with the Muslim World League.
It was out of the IIFSO’s experience of success that the WAMY was born. The WAMY was founded in 1972 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, at an international meeting of Islamic workers involved in youth activities and representatives of youth organizations. It was established to help youth organizations around the world implement their planned projects. It has been holding its international meetings about every three years and publishes a newsletter in Arabic and English, Al-mustagbill The Future. The headquarters of the WAMY is located in Riyadh and its regional offices are located in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), Malaysia, Spain, Nigeria, and Kenya.
In keeping with its international outlook, the IIFSO has sought to maintain active communication not only with its various components and other Islamic organizations but also with international organizations. It has nongovernmental operation status with the United Nations. It participated in the World Youth Conference in Spain in 1985, in the Conference on Muslims for World Peace in 1987 in Baku, Azerbaijan, and in the International Conference on Youth Services in Chicago, sponsored by the United Nations in 1985. It took part in the U.N.’s Fifth Session of the High Level Committee on the Review of Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries held in New York in May 1987, and an IIFSO representative attended the International Conference Against Drug Abuse in Vienna in 1987.
The IIFSO has participated in various national and international book fairs held in Cairo, Khartoum, Brussels, Washington, D.C., and several other American cities, Singapore, New Delhi, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Germany.
The IIFSO is active in promoting human rights throughout the world. It has lent its active support to human rights organizations focusing on problems in South Asia, North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. It took an early lead in the Peoples’ Republic of China as soon as an opening for religious work seemed to appear. For several years, the IIFSO published Al-akhbdr (The News) in Arabic and sometimes in English. A direct source of news about the Muslim world, it was an important source of information about the violation of the human rights of Muslim minorities.
[See also Youth Movements.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Altalib, Hisham. Training Guide for Islamic Workers. Herndon, Va., 1991.
The First 20 Years of IIFSO. Salumyah, Kuwait, 1989. Toward a Global Islamic Brotherhood. Herndon, Va., 1987.
SAYYID MUHAMMAD SYEED