irp – Hybrid Learning

ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY

Batoota — Thu, 12 Jun 2014 07:39:12 +0000

ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY. Founded in February 1979, shortly after the fall of the Iranian monarchy, the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) had the approval of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989), and its key founding members were among his top clerical loyalists. Foremost among them were Muhammad Bihishti, `Abd al-Karim Musavi Ardabili, `Ali Khamene’i, ‘All Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani, and Muhammad Javad Bahunar. All were also members of the Revolutionary Council. Bihishti was the secretary general of the IRP and the Revolutionary Council concurrently. The close connection between the two bodies was acknowledged by Rafsanjani during the first party congress in 1983. The Revolutionary Council, however, had been disbanded in July 1980.

The IRP was not a regular political party. It neither institutionalized a party structure nor encouraged increased membership. Formal membership was never emphasized and did not seem important. From the start, the party served as a mobilizer of some of the traditional and reactionary forces of Iranian society. It formed a united front through a loose coalition of various Islamic groups and organizations, clerics, and nonclerical elements that endorsed Khomeini’s version of an Islamic government. A multitude of persons and groups whose interests ran counter to the religious moderates, secularists, liberals, and leftists was utilized by the IRP to undermine these voices. The divided character of the non-IRP groups, their ideological, organizational, and personal conflicts, as well as their inexperience in the intricacies of governance, helped contribute to the IRP success.
Under the shrewd leadership of Bihishti, the IRP moved swiftly toward monopolizing state power. It became a focal point for unleashing Islamic forces on grassroots organizations and independent groups, and it organized Islamic associations inside the workplace to counter the independent workers’ councils. On university and college campuses, Islamic student groups were encouraged to take matters into their own hands. The IRP organized rallies and demonstrations against other groups, advocated purges of government institutions and the overhaul of the state bureaucracy, pushed for the execution of the officials of the previous regime, and ordered the confiscation of their properties and the takeover of some sectors of the Iranian economy. The IRP also played an important role in the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran in November 1979.
These activities did not always occur under the rubric of the IRP or the person of Ayatollah Khomeini. The presence of autonomous and semiautonomous groups and individuals in the party facilitated a chain of action with the sole purpose of eliminating those perceived as the enemies of the revolution and guaranteeing governance for the Khomeini loyalists. For example, although Sipah-i Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islami (the Revolutionary Guards) and the Hizbullah (the Party of God) adherents were not part of the IRP, they served as its agents. [See Sipah-i Pasdaran-i Inqildb-i Islam!; and Hizbullah, article on Hizbullah in Iran.] Also, not all pro-Khomeini clerics and groups were supportive of the IRP or of Bihishti. The most prominent among these nonsupporters were members of the religiously conservative Jam’iyah-yi Mudarrisin-i Qom (Theological Teachers’ Association of Qom). The teachers’ group was sharply critical of the idea of a political party, but since such groups could not dominate the political scene or singlehandedly eliminate the liberal or left factions, it sided with the IRP. Other groups, such as the Jam’Iyahyi Ruhaniyat-i Mubariz (Association of the Combatant Clerics) never directly joined the IRP but formed a temporary coalition in order to gain a foothold in the 1980 parliamentary elections.
A majority of the elected candidates to the Majlis-i Khabarigan (Assembly of Experts), a crucial body charged with drafting a new constitution, came from the IRP coalition. Ayatollah Bihishti became vice chair of the Assembly of Experts and ran most of its public and private meetings. The Revolutionary Council and the IRP vigorously campaigned for the approval of the constitution in the December 1979 referendum.
Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr’s election in January 1980 as the first president of postrevolutionary Iran was a significant setback for the IRP. The party had pressed for the postponement of the presidential elections until the last day. Bani Sadr’s close connection to Khomeini, his popularity among the anti-IRP groups, and the top clerics’ general ambivalence about the IRP’s capability to govern joined to bring about the IRP defeat in January 1980. Yet in February, Bihishti, maintaining all his previous positions, became the head of the Supreme Court.
Thereafter, the IRP put all of its efforts into gaining a majority in the first parliamentary elections after the revolution, to be held in March 198o. Several developments are of political significance. In mid-February 1980, the Revolutionary Council decided to change the election law. An absolute majority was required in order to win the first round of balloting, failing which the top two candidates had to participate in a runoff election. With the exception of the IRP, most groups and organizations opposed the two rounds of balloting, arguing that it worked to the disadvantage of small parties. The IRP then moved to form a grand coalition of diverse Islamic groups. It also used its connections and clout to change the boundaries of various constituencies to the IRP’s advantage. Obstruction of the campaigns of other political parties was systematic. Many small-party candidates were disqualified and demonstrations were disallowed; Friday prayer sermons and religious broadcasts on television and radio were used as campaign forums. On the day of the elections, fraud and irregularities were rampant. The result was an impressive success for the IRP and the independent Islamic elements. About half of those elected in the first round in March and more than half in the second round of elections in May were part of the IRP coalition. Rafsanjani was elected speaker of the Majlis (parliament) on 20 July 1980.
IRP control of the parliament presented an added challenge to Bani Sadr. The IRP and the president clashed over many issues, including the choice of a prime minister and cabinet heads. Muhammad `All Raja% a Majlis deputy from Tehran and an IRP member, was imposed as prime minister on the president, touching off a constitutional crisis and immobilizing state functions. Ignoring the chain of command, Raja’i regularly opposed Bani Sadr. These confrontations came to symbolize anticlerical versus clerical rule. Petitions were signed and demonstrations were held asking for the dissolution of the IRP. Grand Ayatollahs `Abd Allah Shiraz! and Hasan Tabataba’i Qummi declared their support for the president. Ayatollah Khomeini interceded, asking all sides to cease their quarrels, but to no avail. The IRP’s propaganda and mobilization of street mobs and parliamentary deputies eventually resulted in Bani Sadr’s removal by Khomeini on 22 June 1981 and a major crackdown against all anticlerical groups. The Temporary Council of the Presidency was established to oversee the change. Its three members were Bihishti, Raja% and Rafsanjani.
On 28 June, 1981, the IRP headquarters in Tehran was destroyed in a major bomb blast. Seventy-four people were killed, including Bihisht-1, Majlis deputies, high-ranking government officials, and other party members. Although the government blamed the organization known as the Mujahidin-i Khalq, no one claimed responsibility for the blast. This fueled rumors that interclerical rivalry and anti-Bihishti sentiments were responsible for the bombing. [See Mujahidin, article on Mujahidin-i Khalq.]
Muhammad Javad Bahunar, the minister of education, became secretary-general of the party; in July elections Raja’! was elected president (confirmed by Khomeini on a August 1 98 1 ), and he chose Bahunar as his prime minister. Musavi Ardabill replaced Bihishti as the head of the Supreme Court. On 3o August 1981, both Bahunar and Raja’! were killed in another bomb blast in the premier’s office. Again, with impressive speed, the regime moved to fill the gap. Khamene’i became secretary-general of the IRP and, in October, was elected the third president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He held both positions concurrently until the dissolution of the IRP in 1987.
The goals of the IRP were not spelled out until its first and last party congress in May 1983. Many observers believe that the congress was convened in order to regroup the party and save it from internal fracture. Prior to this date, the IRP had not issued any document on its general ideological outlook. The congress revealed that the goal of the party was to bring together and coordinate dispersed Islamic forces in order to prevent them from neutralizing each other. Difficulties and sharp ideological divisions in the party were acknowledged, yet party members were urged to cooperate with nonparty persons and groups, because they were a valuable asset to the Islamic regime. No statements were made on possible plans to increase membership. Reports indicated that around a thousand members and several nonparty political dignitaries were invited as guests and observers. For the first time, a general plan of action was approved and members were voted on for two councils: the Central Council of the party and the Council of Jurisdiction. The latter’s task was to mitigate infighting and to remove factional disputes. Its five members were Khamene’i, Rafsanjani, MuhammadMahdi Rabban! Amlishi, `Abbas-Va’z Tabarsi, and Muhammad ‘Ali Muvahhid! Kirmani.
The precise ideological orientation of the IRP is more difficult to describe. It was a goal-oriented party whose task, the institutionalization of an Islamic state, had already been accomplished. It is clear, however, that the fall of Bani Sadr and the death of Bihisht! prompted a resurfacing of personal and ideological conflicts among Islamic forces. Bihishti’s death, in particular, marked the beginning of the end for the IRP. His sagacious and farsighted managerial skill and his ability to bring together diverse and hostile forces under the party umbrella were lost forever. The nature of the intraelite conflict remains obscure owing to its fluid nature, secrecy, and personalism. Personal rivalries were often disguised as ideological disagreements, and individuals shifted their positions and allegiances from one group or issue to another. Adding to the confusion is that certain groups and individual clergy already independent from the IRP still worked with the party on issues of mutual interest. This was acceptable to the party, which did not attempt to coerce any entity into joining the organization; there was no particular reward or punishment for membership. These independent centers of power were both a source of attraction and emulation by inner-party circles.
Observers of elite factionalism have identified various tendencies within the IRP. Although a concise categorization is an impossible task, some conflicting ideological tendencies are identifiable. In 1983, on the eve of the formation of the Assembly of Experts to decide on a successor to Khomeini, a number of ideological clashes resurfaced. The naming of Husein Ali Montazeri (Husayn ‘Ali Muntaziri) as the successor to Khomeini prompted a public display of political and personal rifts. Two prominent camps were referred to as the Maktabi and the Hujjatiyah groups. Each embraced several minigroups with clerical adherents from the IRP. The two groups seem to have differed on the type of leadership that they wanted in the post-Khomeini era (individual cleric versus collective leadership), the nature of social and economic reform (strong centralized government versus less government monopoly), the extent of clerical involvement in politics (more active versus a less-visible role), and several other issues. In the summer of 1983, the Hujjatiyah group was attacked in the media and accused of being antirevolutionary and in doubt of Khomeini’s leadership. Then, public references to the Hujjatiyah suddenly ceased, prompting rumors that the group had suspended its activities. Rarely was there any mention of even the Maktabis after this incident. Public displays seemed to have turned private again.
It is not certain which clerical elite belonged to which faction. Both Khamene’i and Rafsanjani were rumored to belong to either group. Bihishti, Bahunar, and Muhammad Riza Mahdavi-Kani were identified with the Hujjatiyah. Prime Minister Mir Husayn Musavi, Mfisavi Ardabili, Muhammad Musavi Khu’iniha (the leader of the Students of the Imam’s Line-the group that took over the American embassy in November 1979) and ‘Ali Mashkini (chair of the Assembly of Experts) were rumored to be Maktabis.
Throughout 1984, 1985, and 1986, elite factionalism in the party’s top leadership intensified. Khamene’i and Rafsanjani were rumored to be heading opposing factions of the party. In public, however, they acknowledged the presence of factionalism but exhibited comradery toward each other. Some observers believe that the nature of the conflict was in terms of left versus right; the leftists were understood to be more militant on foreign policy and favored a state monopoly of principal economic assets; and the rightists were believed to be dominated by the rich bazaaris and to favor less central control and the toning down of antiimperialist rhetoric. The two factions were unable to reach an agreement or to compromise.
Another dimension of this conflict is the dubious role played by small associations, individual cliques, and sympathizers. The followers of one faction who worked in semiautonomous institutions and government offices and ministries could easily undermine any coherent action by the opposite side. Smaller groups were splitting into several subfactions.
In an environment of much less diversity and of clerical domination, war with Iraq, popular discontent, and elite factionalism, the second parliamentary elections were held in 1984. Voters were told that they had options other than the Islamic Republican Party and the clerics. The IRP list of candidates appeared along with other groups and associations’ lists. Almost two-thirds of the candidates appeared on most lists, yet beneath the surface, there was fierce competition between the two dominant party factions. The election resulted in the IRP being the only political party and holding a little less than half of the parliamentary seats.
In October 1985, Khamene’i became president for a second term. Factionalism remained and rivalries were exposed in the presidential campaign, as well as in the nomination of Prime Minister Musavi. A significant feature of this presidential election was the way in which groups and individuals were trying to disassociate themselves from the party. For instance, Sayyid Mahmud Kashani, who was an IRP member, ran against Khamene’i, claiming that he was not a member of the party. Meanwhile, both Khomeini and Montazeri made repeated appeals to various factions to stop their infighting.
Public exposure of the secret negotiations with the United States and the Reagan administration in the IranContra affair further worsened the inner-party struggle. A major meeting of the party elite failed to bring about a peaceful resolution. The Central Council of the IRP discussed the viability of different options, including maintaining the party, dissolving it, or dividing it into several parties. Arguments raised at the inception of the IRP were raised again with more vigor. Hizbullah, for example, unhappy with the title of “party” for anyone but the Party of God, now raised its objections again to the idea of continuing the IRP. Worsening conflict penetrated provincial and city levels, hindering party activity. In many parts of the country, party headquarters were either closed or operated part-time.
It is unclear which faction originally recommended the end of the IRP. It was rumored that the right wing favored the continuation of the party. Officially, however, Khamene’i and Rafsanjani, in a letter to Khomeini, explained that under the circumstances there was no need for a political party and that the two opposing camps might hurt national unity. By order of Ayatollah Khomeini, on 2 June 1987, the Islamic Republican Party was officially dissolved.
[See also Iran; Iranian Revolution of 1979; and the biography of Khomeini. ]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Scholarship devoted exclusively to the Islamic Republican Party is scarce. Information for the above article was obtained from primary sources and the following works:
Akhavi, Shahrough. “Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Middle East Journal 41 (Spring 1987): 181 -2o I. Outstanding analysis of the nature of intra-elite conflict and its impact on public policy.
Bakhash, Shaul. The Reign of the Ayatollahs. New York, 1984. Insightful account of developments leading to the clerical takeover of the state apparatus.
Bayat, Assef. “Labor and Democracy in Post-Revolutionary Iran.” In Post-Revolutionary Iran, edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin, pp. 41-55. Boulder and London, 1988. Excellent analysis of the relationship between the independent workers’ councils and Islamic forces, including the Islamic Republican Party. Menashri, David. Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution. New York and London, 1990 Extremely useful interpretive survey of developments in Iran based on more than a dozen newspapers and periodicals and an array of reports from news agencies, radio stations, and monitoring services.
Schahgaldian, Nikola B. The Clerical Establishment in Iran. Santa Monica, Calif., 1989. Useful analysis of the evolution of Shi’ i clerical rule, including various Islamic associations and groups.
ELIZ SANASARIAN

ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY

Batoota — Thu, 12 Jun 2014 06:57:50 +0000

ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY. Surfacing in the Soviet Union during the summer of 1990, the Islamic Renaissance/Revival Party (IRP, or Hizb-i Nahzat-i Islami) developed as opportunities for religious expression expanded under the policy of glasnost (openness) introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev. Just as the Soviet Tatars persuaded Stalin in 1942 to allow the formal Islamic hierarchy to function, so too the formation of the IRP began under Tatar Islamic leadership. The movement for Islamic revival represents the convergence of two streams in Soviet Islam-one official and represented by the four official directorates (at Ufa, Makhachkala, Tashkent, and Baku), and the other unofficial and underground. As the Soviet Union disintegrated; the support system for the maintenance of the official and restricted structure of Islam, marked by a limited number of functioning mosques, trained clergy, and seminaries (madrasahs), also began to diminish. This shifting situation allowed the emergence of young, educated, outspoken clerics who were less subservient to the directives of the Communist Party, and it removed the fear of persecution that had kept influential religious leaders underground. While some clerics were removed as a result of popular protest (for example, Mufti Ziauddin Babakhanov), others achieved wide influence (Mufti Tajuddin and Qazi Akbar Turajonzoda among them). During the period between 1990 and 1991 when the political situation in all parts of the former Soviet Union was fluid, the divisions between official and unofficial Islam became blurred, only to separate again in those parts of Central Asia where Islamic political activity unsuccessfully challenged the political dominance of the reemerging elites of the old order. The surfacing of unofficial Islam and the organized activities of the IRP have resulted in a transformation of Islam in Russia and in Central Asia into a more confident, moralistic, and potentially powerful force.

Organization. The IRP was established on the broad pattern of the Communist Party in that it was an all USSR party initially, with individual parties in each of the republics; parties were formed in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, and possibly also in Moldavia and Georgia. Where forced to remain an underground organization, the IRP was organized into cells. It declared itself an all-Union religio-political organization of Muslims. Its three fundamental goals are spiritual revival, economic freedom, and the political and legal awakening of Muslims with the aim of activating in everyday life the basics of the Qur’an and the sunnah. Three methods to achieve these goals are outlined in the party bylaws: “to spread Islam by all the communications means available among all people; active participation by Muslims in the economic, political and spiritual life of the country; living, on a daily basis, by every member of the IRP a life according to the precepts of Islam.”
By the summer of 1991, one year after its official formation, the party functioned openly throughout the Soviet Union, although it was formally banned in some republics, including Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The existence of the IRP, even under the ban, exerted influence on the religious establishments of these two republics perhaps more than elsewhere. In Uzbekistan, the Office of the Mufti promoted Islamic precepts through all media, especially with regard to moral family life, proscription of alcohol, and Qur’anic education. Moreover, the influence of the IRP could be seen in the extensive programs for the education of women in proper Muslim decorum and dress, conducted through the official Islamic establishment. In Tajikistan the IRP played a pivotal role in the opposition movement (1992) and in the subsequent civil war that has spilled over into Afghanistan.
Membership in the IRP is open to Muslim men and women fifteen years and older, regardless of ethnic background. Republic parties were urged to avoid ethnic exclusiveness and to concentrate on the Muslim ummah. Members must live according to Islamic precepts, support the program of the IRP, and be recommended for membership by two current members. Any member who joins another party would be excluded from membership, a provision that was intended specifically to exclude Communist Party members.
The members of the IRP are mainly small-town and village youth who have received advanced education in cities but whose formative years were spent in unobtrusively religious surroundings. Because the IRP agenda is specifically attuned to the concerns of youth and professionals as well as to the propagation of Islamic principles, the party attracts students. It takes a conciliatory stance vis-a-vis the religious establishment, although its political agenda keeps some clerics aloof from the party. However, the existence of the party allows for a more visible advocacy of Islamic customs such as observation of fasts, modest female attire, and national celebration of religious occasions. Agenda. The thirty-two-point agenda of the IRP is marked by a call for active Islamic practice in all sectors of society, especially cultural, social, and economic. To this end it stresses moral interpersonal actions, the defense of Islam against the grafting on to it of any “ignorant contemporary” (i.e., non-Islamic) doctrine, and the resolution of disputes through the Qur’an and sunnah. In addition, the agenda supports the promotion of sports and health programs, provision of welfare for the needy, private ownership of property, and support of ecological activity to restore human-caused damage to nature. The last acknowledges the degradation of the Aral Sea, which affects most of the Muslims of the former Soviet Union. The establishment of an Islamic society is the ultimate goal of the IRP; however, it remains unclear whether this means the formation of an Islamic government, as the IRP has yet to gain sufficient political power to put its agenda into action.
Activity in Tajikistan. The IRP officially formed in Tajikistan on 26 October 1991, although it had become active long before, especially at universities, polytechnics, and pedagogical institutions, and among skilled workers at factories and state farms. Its semiclandestine newspaper, Najot (Salvation), appeared sporadically during the spring of z991. During the national elections in November 1991, the IRP did not endorse any of the eight candidates; its membership appeared split between the two leading candidates, although the youth tended to favor the candidate standing in opposition to the Communist Party slate. After the election the IRP gained legal status in Tajikistan for a period until, after the political turmoil of civil war, it was banned again on 21 June 1993 together with all other active parties in the country. Perhaps because its past was unblemished by Communist Party association (a problem for leaders of the other parties), the IRP was widely regarded as able to muster popular support from the outlying regions as well as in the capital, Dushanbe. For this reason it held a place of importance in the coalition that formed in opposition to Rahman Nabiev in late i991 and throughout 1992. Additionally, Akbar Turajonzoda, the qazi (Ar., qadi) of Tajikistan, a vigorous man in his late thirties-though appointed by the official directorate in Tashkent-was regarded as a progressive activist by much of the IRP membership. The IRP became part of the coalition, to which Turajonzoda lent his active support.
Months of opposition activity and the division of Tajikistan into armed camps along lines of regional allegiance erupted into a civil war that forced many among the opposition to flee into Afghanistan. Many of these opposition figures were stripped of immunity as legislative deputies and indicted in absentia on criminal charges for “terrorism,” a tactic specifically prohibited by the IRP.
Relations with Outside Countries. The IRP looks south to the rest of the Islamic world for models and for moral support. Some members regard Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a courageous if not model Muslim, particularly for inviting Mikhail Gorbachev to accept Islam or risk destruction. Others regard the Afghan mujahidin, including the controversial Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as praiseworthy Muslims. Within their own historical background, Tajik IRP members prefer to think of themselves as following in the path carved by the Jadidists or reformists of the early twentieth century. They share with the Jadidists both anti-imperialism (against the West and Russia) and progressive ideas for the betterment of society. Because most Jadidists perished at the hands of the Communists, they may be models for the idealists of the IRP. However, unlike the IRP, Jadidism in general did not regard any religion, even Islam, as the route to sociopolitical development. The IRP has as its ultimate goal stepping into the modern world through the morals and concepts of Islam.
[See also Islam, article on Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus; Jadidism; and Tajikistan.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gretsky, Sergei. “Qadi Akbar Turajonzoda.” Central Asia Monitor i (1994): 16-24. Extensive article by an employee of the qazi of Tajikistan about the role of the Islamic opposition after 1990. Malashenko, Alexie V. “Islam versus Communism: The Experience of Coexistence.” In Russia’s Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in CrossCultural Analysis, edited by Dale F. Eickeleman, pp. 63-78. Bloomington, 1993. A presentation of the role of the IRP in Central Asia by a leading member of the (Soviet) Russian Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences who gives the Moscow perspective.
EDEN NABY