jam`iyatul – Hybrid Learning https://hybridlearning.pk Online Learning Thu, 04 Jul 2024 08:34:56 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.6 JAM’IYATUL `ULAMA’-I- ISLAM https://hybridlearning.pk/2014/07/11/jamiyatul-ulama-islam/ https://hybridlearning.pk/2014/07/11/jamiyatul-ulama-islam/#respond Fri, 11 Jul 2014 17:10:34 +0000 https://hybridlearning.pk/2014/07/11/jamiyatul-ulama-islam/ JAM’IYATUL `ULAMA’-I ISLAM. The origins of the Jamclyatul `Ulama’-i Islam (JUI, Society of Muslim `Ulama’) can be traced to the Deoband movement in prepartition India […]

]]>
JAM’IYATUL `ULAMA’-I ISLAM. The origins of the Jamclyatul `Ulama’-i Islam (JUI, Society of Muslim `Ulama’) can be traced to the Deoband movement in prepartition India and to the `ulama’ who consitituted the Jam’iyatul `Ulama-i Hind (Society of Indian `Ulama’). Such `ulama’ have been typically characterized as “Indian nationalists,” because during the latter days of British India they were unalterably opposed to British imperialism, supported the aims and policies of the Indian National Congress, and opposed the Muslim League’s struggle for an independent Pakistan. Consequently, following the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the creation of Pakistan, the political significance of the JUI was limited, and its leadership was held suspect by successive Pakistani regimes that condemned the JUI’s role in the independence struggle as anti-Pakistan. Indeed, until the late 1960s the JUI remained almost wholly a religious organization with little if any political significance.
jui
This situation changed during the so-called “Disturbances” of 1968-1969 that led ultimately to the resignation of General Muhammad Ayub Khan and to the holding of general elections in 1970. During the ferment of 1969 the JUI split into two factions-a Karachi-based faction under the leadership of Maulana Ihtishamul Haqq Thanvi (later named Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Pakistan, Thanvi Group), and a larger and far more politically active faction led by Maulana Mufti Mahmud and Maulana Ghaus Hazarvi and based in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The latter faction (the MuftiHazarvi Group, hereafter JUI) actively participated in the 1970 general elections as a populist-oriented party, appealing to activist Islamic sentiment. The JUI’s program called for the establishment of an Islamic constitution in accordance with the recommendations of the
Board of `Ulama’ as presented to the Basic Principles Committee Of 1954, which had called for the adoption of the shari`ah as the basis of Pakistan’s consitutional structure. The JUI also called for the end of “capitalist exploitation” and for the establishment of a program of Islamic social welfare including free education, health care, and the introduction of minimum-wage legislation.
The combination of such populist rhetoric, the prestige of the `ulama’ and the JUI’s effective control of relevant mosques led to success at the polls. In the 1970 general election the JUI swept the electoral districts of southern NWFP and entered into a coalition with the National Awami Party (NAP) to form provincial governments in NWFP and Baluchistan. The subsequent naming of Maulana Mufti Mahmud as chief minister of the NWFP (1971-1973) marked the first and only time in Pakistan’s history that an Islam-based party has headed a provincial government.
During Mufti Mahmud’s short-lived tenure his government managed to introduce three laws designed to promote Islam in the province. The first established prohibition of alcohol; the second introduced an Islamic law of pre-emption (i.e., regarding inheritance of land); and the third mandated the enforced observance of the Ramadan fast. These laws have remained on the books in NWFP and have significantly influenced the course of the islamization process in Pakistan during the 1980s and 1990s. The JUI-NAP government of NWFP resigned in early 1973 in protest over Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s perceived persecution of NAP leaders. In the 1977 general elections the JUI allied itself with the antiBhutto coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance. Subsequently the party cooperated, at times reluctantly, with the regime of Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988), and it tacitly supported the IJM (Islamic Democratic Alliance) government of Nawaz Sharif (1990-1992). The JUI maintains a small but loyal and enthusiastic following in the southern region of NWFP and the Pathan-majority areas of Baluchistan. In the 1988 and 1990 general elections it gained seven and six seats respectively in the National Assembly.
During the past decade, under the leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, son of the late Mufti Mahmud, the JUI has become increasingly associated with Islamic orthodoxy. In their religious views JUI members are often criticized by their opponents as “uncompromisingly rigid,” insisting on the strict enforcement of the shari`ah as interpreted by the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. In addition, it is often charged that the JUI is anti-Shi’i. The Jul did support Iraq during the IranIraq war, but it joined the TNFJ (Tahrlk-i Nifaz-i Filth-i Ja’fariyah, the most prominent Pakistani ShN group) in its condemnation of the United States’ role in the Gulf War. Also, Jul `ulama’ are often characterized as opposed to innovation in matters Islamic and as favoring a strict social and moral code, especially with respect to gender relations. Indeed, Jul `ulama’ often draw the ire of Pakistan’s feminist organizations.
Politically, the Jul has been at the forefront of the attempt to implement far-reaching Islamic reforms. This is evidenced by the formulation and introduction in 1985, by the Jul Senators Maulana Sami’ul Haqq and Qazi `Abdullatif, of the so-called “Shariat Bill.” The Jul version of this bill proposed that the shari’ah wholly replace Pakistan’s secular constitution. `Ulama’ associated with the Jul have also been very active in proposing petitions before the Federal Shariat Court calling for significant changes in Pakistan’s social and moral practices to bring them more into keeping with Islamic norms. Generally, Jul members were displeased with what they viewed as the slow pace of Islamic reform under President Zia, and they have been even less pleased with successor regimes.
The 1993 general election proved disappointing to the Jul. The party contested the election under the banner of the newly created Islami Jumhuri Mahaz (Islamic Democratic Association, IJM) and entered into an “electoral arrangement” with the Pakistan People’s Party. However, even after intensive electoral campaigning, the IJM was only able to gain 2.3 percent of the popular vote and four seats. Despite such electoral disappointment, the Jul remains a potent social and political force in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Indeed, the party has deepened its populist image and style. But more important, it has maintained its control over the largest number of mosques and madrasahs in Pakistan, and therefore has the strongest base among the madrasah student body in the state.
[See also Pakistan.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahmad, Mumtaz. “The Politics of War: Islamic Fundamentalisms in Pakistan.” In Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, edited by J. P. Piscatori, pp. 155-185. Chicago, 1991.
Kennedy, Charles H. “Repugnancy to Islam-Who Decides? Islam and Legal Reform in Pakistan.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 41 (1992): 769-787.
CHARLES H. KENNEDY
NOTE: If JUI disagree with this article ,we will welcome and replace the article with the provided one.contact

]]>
https://hybridlearning.pk/2014/07/11/jamiyatul-ulama-islam/feed/ 0
JAM`IYATUL `ULAMA’-I HIND https://hybridlearning.pk/2014/07/11/jamiyatul-ulama-hind/ https://hybridlearning.pk/2014/07/11/jamiyatul-ulama-hind/#respond Fri, 11 Jul 2014 17:01:21 +0000 https://hybridlearning.pk/2014/07/11/jamiyatul-ulama-hind/ JAM`IYATUL `ULAMA’-I HIND. An organization of Muslim religious scholars of India, the Jam’Iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind (Association of the `Ulama’ of India) was established in November […]

]]>
JAM`IYATUL `ULAMA’-I HIND. An organization of Muslim religious scholars of India, the Jam’Iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind (Association of the `Ulama’ of India) was established in November 1919, when numerous `ulama’ from all parts of India came to participate in the Khilafat Movement conference in New Delhi [see Khilafat Movement]. The organization came into being when Indians of all religious affiliations were united in the anti-British struggle. Mohandas Gandhi embraced the cause of the Ottoman caliphate, and most Muslim leaders participated in the noncooperation movement with the Indian National Congress. The Jam’Iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind maintained its pro-Congress attitude throughout the struggle for independence and stood at the head of those Indian Muslims who supported the idea of a united India and opposed the Pakistan movement. (Some of its members, however, seceded in 1946 and established the Jam’Iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam, which supported Pakistan [see Jam`iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam].) Many of the members were associated with the Dar al`Ulum of Deoband. Since its establishment in 1919, the association has held annual conferences in which the `ulama’ have expressed their views on the central issues of the day.
The main contribution of the Jam’Iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind to Indo-Muslim thought is the theory of “composite nationalism” (muttahida qawmiyat). This theory, which was elaborated in speeches and writings of the Jam’Iya leadership and particularly in the works of its longtime president Husain Ahmad Madan! (18791957) served as an alternative to the “two nations theory” (do qawmi nazariyat) of the Muslim League, which formed the ideological basis of the Pakistan movement. According to the theory of “composite nationalism,” nations can be created by various factors, such as religion, race, homeland, language, or color. In this analysis, a “nation” (qawm) is not an exclusive category: a person can belong simultaneously to several “nations” created by different characteristics. In modern times, the most important nation-building factor has been the homeland; the Muslims of India therefore belong to the same nation as other Indians, and India constitutes a nation despite its religious diversity. Nevertheless, according to the religious criterion, Muslims continue to belong to the Muslim (qawm)
The Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind thus accepted the idea of territorial nationalism. This is a novel idea in Islamic thought, and the `ulama’ devoted considerable intellectual effort to provide it with Islamic legitimacy. The classical Islamic precedent repeatedly used for this purpose is the Covenant of Medina (`ahd al-ummah), the document that the Prophet is said to have issued in order to regulate the relationship between the Emigrants (muhajirun), the Helpers (ansdr), and the Jews in Medina after the Hijrah. One of its sections states that “the Jews of `Awf are one community with the believers; the Jews have their religion and the Muslims theirs.” The `ulama’ concluded from this passage that the Prophet himself agreed to the inclusion of non-Muslims in the same nation with Muslims. The history of Mughal India is also seen as vindicating the composite nationalism theory. The Mughal period knew no communalism (firqah vdriyat, firqah parasti); all Indians were treated equally by the rulers. Although the Muslims who established the Mughal empire came from outside India, once they settled there they became an inextricable part of Indian nationhood (hindustani gawmiyat). Communalism emerged in India only as a result of British policies.
The practical political conclusion from this interpretation of Muslim and Indo-Muslim history was the demand that Muslims cooperate with the Indian National Congress in order to expel the British from India and to achieve independence for the country. The `ulama’ envisaged that in an independent and united India, achieved with Muslim cooperation, the Muslims would have significant influence, their family law and religious institutions would be maintained, and governments with a Muslim majority would be established in several provinces. On the basis of these expectations, they appealed to Muslims not to join the Muslim League, even declaring membership in it a sin. The `ulama’ were convinced that the Western-educated element so prominent in the League’s leadership would never be able or willing to establish an Islamic state compatible with the traditional religious ideal of the `ulama’ They also maintained that the establishment of Pakistan would not solve the communal problem because many millions of Muslims would remain in the Indian part of the subcontinent and would live in an atmosphere of hate generated by the partition. On the other hand, the establishment of a strong and unified India, in which the Muslims would be an influential and significant minority, would benefit not only the Muslims of the subcontinent but also the Muslims of the rest of the world.
The views of the Jam’iya did not prevail during the struggle for independence, and in 1947 the subcontinent was partitioned between India and Pakistan. In independent India the Jam`iya acquired increased importance in the new political structure. In contradistinction to the Muslim League and other organizations that supported the creation of Pakistan, the Jam’iya possessed impeccable credentials of opposition to partition and was a natural candidate to represent Indian Muslims. Shortly after independence, the `ulama’ called upon Indian Muslims to declare their unswerving loyalty to India. Several of the ideas adopted by the `ulama’ after partition were rather bold from the vantage point of traditional Islam. They accepted the idea of a secular state, which they conceived as neutral in matters of religion. They gave qualified support to the idea of a composite Indian culture. They severed all ties with Jam’iya branches in the territories now incorporated in Pakistan, even though this was a country established in the name of Islam and inhabited mostly by Muslims. They supported Indian policies even on issues that were sensitive from the Muslim point of view, such as Kashmir and Hyderabad.
The Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind is a rare, and possibly unique, case of an association of traditional Muslim religious scholars who have willingly bestowed legitimacy upon the policies of a non-Muslim and professedly secular government, born out of conflict with the generally acknowledged leadership of their own community.
[See also All-India Muslim League; India; Pakistan.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahmad, Aziz. Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964. London and New York, 1967, pp. 186-194.
Faruqi, Zia-ul-Hasan. The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan. Bombay, 1963.
Friedmann, Yohanan. “The Attitude of the Jam`iyyat al-`ulama’-I Hind to the Indian National Movement and to the Establishment of Pakistan.” Asian and African Studies 7 (1971): 157-180. Friedmann, Yohanan, “The jam’iyyat al-`ulama’-i Hind in the Wake of Partition.” Asian and African Studies I I (1976): 181-211. Hardy, Peter. Partners in Freedom-and True Muslims: The Political Thought of Some Muslim Scholars in British India, 1912-1947. Lund, 1971.
Mushir-ul-Haq. Islam in Secular India. Simla, 1972. Important for the postindependence period.
Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain. Ulema in Politics: A Study Relating to the Activities of the Ulema in the South-Asian Subcontinent from 1556 to 1947. New Delhi, 1985. Criticism of the activities of the Jam`iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind from a Pakistani vantage point.
YOHANAN FRIEDMANN

]]>
https://hybridlearning.pk/2014/07/11/jamiyatul-ulama-hind/feed/ 0