Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

Batoota — Tue, 30 Sep 2014 15:51:12 +0000

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
Contemporary Islamic social and political activism in Egypt is rooted in the founding in 1928 by Hasan alBanna’ of Jam’iyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Society of Muslim Brothers; also known as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Ikhwan). From the beginning, the Ikhwan’s goals were both social and political, promoting the causes of benevolence, charity, and development, on the one hand, and nationalism, independence, and Islamism, on the other. Throughout the Ikhwan’s nearly seventy-year history, “Islamism” has consistently meant the reform of society. More recently, this goal has been expanded to include the full establishment of shad ah (Islamic law). To achieve such goals, the tactics used by various groupings within the Ikhwan have ranged from activism and proregime political accommodation to militancy and antiregime assassinations and violence; from philanthropy and economic institution building to accommodation with opposition political parties.
Although Islamism and nationalism theoretically should be seen as mutually exclusive, in fact the Ikhwan has pursued both simultaneously. According to the Ikhwan, Egypt is “a part of the general Arab nation [watan], and when we act for Egypt, we act for Arabism, the East, and for Islam” (Mitchell, 1969, p. 264).
Hasan al-Banna’ and the Founding of the Ikhwan. Hasan al-Banna’ was born in October 1906 in Buhayrah Province, northeast of Cairo. His father was imam and teacher at the local mosque. By his early teen years, alBanna’ was committed to Sufism, teaching, organizing for the cause of Islam, nationalism, and activism. As an organizer, he worked with various societies. At the age of twelve, in his hometown of Mahmudiyah, he became the leader of the Society for Moral Behavior and soon thereafter, a member of the Hasafiyah Sufi order. At age thirteen, he was named secretary of the Hasafiyah
Society for Charity, whose goals were to preserve Islamic morality and resist Christian missionaries. Ahmad al-Sukkari, head of the order, later helped al-Banna’ develop the idea of the Ikhwan.
Al-Banna’ came of age as Sa’d Zaghlul and his Wafd Party agitated for independence from Great Britain and for a liberal political experiment. He entered Dar al’Ulum (Teacher’s College) in Cairo in 1923 and graduated in 1927 at the age of twenty-one. He received a modern education in the sciences, as well as a continuation of his classical Islamic learning. Combined with the extracurricular influences of Sufism, the thought of Muhammad Rashid Rida and the Salafiyah movement, nationalism, and his father’s instruction, al-Banna’ developed a diverse intellectual basis for his own mission. This development continued with his first job, teaching Arabic in a primary school in Isma’iliyah, the heart of the British-occupied Suez Canal Zone.
A teacher by day to schoolchildren, al-Banna’ was active at night instructing the parents and elders of Isma’iliyah, especially laborers, small merchants, and civil servants. Beyond the school and mosque, al-Banna’ held discussion groups in coffeehouses and other popular meeting places. He was equally active in lobbying the power brokers of his new community, the `ulama’) shaykhs of Sufi orders, leading families, and social and religious organizations or clubs.
Al-Banna’ was deeply troubled by the foreign presence in Isma`iliyah. His nationalist sentiments were merged with anticolonialism, as he spoke against British military occupation, the Suez Canal Company, foreign control of public utilities, and the extreme gap between the luxurious lifestyles of foreign owners and managers and the miserable conditions of Egyptian employees and servants.
But it was in the capital where al-Banna’s service to the message of Islam would be most needed and where it had its greatest chance for success. In 1927, he supported the creation in Cairo of the Young Men’s Muslim Association. In March 1928, in Isma`illyah, he founded his own Society of Muslim Brothers.
The first four years of the organization’s existence were used to solidify support in and around Isma`iliyah. Al-Banna’ and fellow members toured the countryside preaching the message of Islam in mosques, homes, the workplace, clubs and coffeehouses. Branches were established in Port Said and Suez City, and other contacts were made in Cairo and parts of the Nile Delta. A headquarters was established, and separate schools for boys and for girls were built, along with mosques, clubs, and small home industries.
Al-Banna’ was denounced by various groups as a communist, a Wafdist, an antimonarchist republican, and a criminal violating civil-service regulations governing the collection of money. However, he was consistently cleared of the allegations of criminal misconduct leveled against him, some by dissidents in his own organization. In 1932, he was transferred to Cairo, where he joined his brother, `Abd al-Rahman al-Banna’, and his Society for Islamic Culture. The two brothers merged their operations to form the first branch of the Ikhwan in Cairo.
The 1930s was a time for organization building, honing the message of the Ikhwan, and developing print media to spread the message throughout and beyond the membership. It was also a time of political activism, as al-Banna’ began to communicate directly with kings (Fu’ad and Farouk [Faruq]), prime ministers (particularly Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha), and heads of all Arab governments. The message was one of reforming government and society in the spirit and letter of Islam. The Ikhwan also became active in raising funds to aid Palestinian Arabs in their resistance to Zionism, in particular to maintain the Arab Strike of 1936-1939
In the 1940s, the Ikhwan was the most popular and respected of the nationalist forces in fighting against British imperialism and military occupation and in the growing struggle against Zionism in Palestine. The Wafd and the palace, having been too closely associated with the British, were by now discredited as nationalist forces.
Beyond al-Banna’. The leaders and theoreticians of the Ikhwan are among the most influential of Egypt’s twentieth-century political figures. After his assassination by police on 12 February 1949, Hasan al-Banna’ was succeeded as general guide (murshid `amm) by Hasan al-Hudaybi (1949-1972) a judge and an outsider to the Muslim Brotherhood. His son, Ma’mun alHudaybi, has been the official spokesperson of the Ikhwan since the mid-1980s, although the supreme leadership remained with `Umar al-Tilimsani (1972-1986), the third general guide, and Hamid Abu al-Nasr, his successor.
The most famous theoretician of the brotherhood is Sayyid Qutb, who joined the Ikhwan after al-Banna’s assassination in 1949, was chief spokesman for the brotherhood after its second dissolution in 1954, and was himself executed by the regime of President Gamal
Abdel Nasser in 1966. Qutb was influenced by the Pakistani theologian, Sayyid Abu al-A’la Mawdudi, and in turn influenced the thoughts of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran, as well as such Egyptian militant groups as al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah and al-Jihad, the latter responsible for the assassination of Anwar el-Sadat in 1981. Qutb’s principal concern was for the use of jihad (struggle), against Jahili (ignorant or pagan) societies, both Western and so-called Islamic ones, that were in need of radical transformation. Having lived in the United States for two years in the late 1940s, he had become disenchanted with what he saw as the moral decadence of Western civilization and its anti-Arab bias. He moved into a leadership role in the Ikhwan and paved the way for confrontation with the Nasser regime.
The Free Officers and other army officials had strong contacts with the Ikhwan well before the 1952 coup. Sadat had been the principal liaison between the two groups until the early 1940s and was replaced in 1942 by `Abd al-Mun’im `Abd al-Ra’uf, who was both a dedicated member of the Ikhwan and a Free Officer. The 1954 assassination attempt against Nasser, purportedly by a member of the Ikhwan, put a quick and final end to the accommodation between the two groups. It also allowed Nasser to displace General Muhammad Neguib, titular head of the Free Officers, whose name was linked with the Ikhwan. The brotherhood was disbanded and its activities prohibited by Nasser. Thousands of brothers were imprisoned. Several were hanged in 1954, and several more in the 1960s Many remained in prison for seventeen years.
Sadat, after succeeding Nasser in 197o and in need of support against leftists in his government, rehabilitated the Ikhwan and sought its support. He released members of the brotherhood in 1971, including al-Tilimsani, whom Nasser had imprisoned. Yet Sadat refused to grant the Ikhwan unconditional legal status as a political party or as a jam`iyah (private voluntary organization [PVO]) registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs. In 1979, in the midst of increasing criticism by the brotherhood of his peace initiative with Israel, Sadat offered to confer PVO status on the Ikhwan, as well as to appoint al-Tilimsani to the Shura Council (upper chamber of parliament), on condition that the brothers moderate their criticism of his policies. Al-Tilimsani rejected this overture, as it would have placed his society under direct governmental control and given the Ministry of Social Affairs the ability to dissolve the organization at will, confiscate its properties, and change its board of directors. Al-Tilimsani would also have been beholden to the president rather than a voting membership or public.
Al-Tilimsani and the other top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were among the approximately 1,500 arrested by Sadat in September 1981. Two-thirds of this total were from the brotherhood and other Islamic groups. The leadership was released after Sadat’s assassination on 6 October. The Ikhwdn was not implicated in that violence and had by this time established itself as a nonviolent opposition movement. With this new image and reality, al-Tilimsani made a concerted effort to move the organization into the mainstream of political and social life in Egypt. Under his leadership, the brotherhood accepted political pluralism and parliamentary democracy. Unable to form its own party because of Egypt’s party law, the Ikhwdn formed an alliance with the Wafd Party in the 1984 parliamentary elections. This alliance gained 65 seats (out of 450), seven of which were earmarked for Muslim Brothers. This victory made these often uncomfortable allies the primary opposition group against the ruling party, President Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP).
By 1987, the coalition collapsed and the Muslim Brotherhood formed a new Islamic Alliance with the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Party to contest that year’s parliamentary elections. The brotherhood had the dominant position in this alliance. The first priority in the Ikhwan’s ten-point platform was the implementation of shard `ah (divine law). The only campaign slogan for the alliance was “al-Islam huwa al-hall” (“Islam is the solution”). The brothers also reached out to Egypt’s Coptic Christian community. The second of their ten points called for “full equal rights and obligations between Muslims and their Coptic brothers.” Moreover, the only Copt at the top of any party list and elected in 1987 was on the Islamic Alliance list. (The Ikhwdn joined with most of the other opposition parties in boycotting the 1990 elections.) This political moderation and willingness to approach constitutional reform through gradual means have placed the Ikhwdn in the forefront of public debate over the most crucial issues in Egypt, especially the question of the appropriate role of religion in politics and society.
The publications of the Ikhwan over the years have also had a significant impact on the course of public debate. Hasan al-Bannd’ knew the importance of communication, both to spread his message and to refute official or other adversarial reports about him and his organization. Since 1933 and the publication of Majallat al-Ikhwdn al-Muslimun (Magazine of the Muslim Brothers), the society has struggled against government censorship and internal divisions to produce a host of newsletters, magazines, and journals. These include: Al-nadhir (The Warner; 1938-1939) Al-manar (The Lighthouse; 1939-1941), previously the organ of the Salafiyah movement and Muhammad Rashid Ridd; AlIkhwan al-Muslimun (The Muslim Brothers; 19421948), first a biweekly then a daily newspaper; and Alshihab (The Meteor; 1946-1948), a research journal. The last two were suspended in 1948 when the Muslim Brotherhood was dissolved for the first time.
Al-da’wah (The Call) appeared from 1951 to 1956, struggling in the last two years in an atmosphere of government censorship and, finally, the official disbanding of the Ikhwdn. In 1976, Al-da’wah, along with other religious and oppositional publications, were allowed to publish again, as Sadat sought to demonstrate to Western supporters his commitment to political as well as economic liberalization. In addition to a campaign against the Camp David peace process, which was portrayed as humiliating and degrading to Egypt, and against Sadat’s reform of family law and women’s rights, Al-da`wah kept up a steady campaign for the more general goals of Islamic renewal of society and full implementation of shard `ah. Sadat banned this publication in September 1981 during his infamous crackdown on opposition leaders and others. In the mid-1980s, the Ikhwdn launched another effort, Liwa’ al-Islam (The Banner of Islam), a weekly publication. This would-be successor to Al-da’wah was also banned (temporarily) during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, owing in part to its criticism of Egypt’s participation in the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq.
Connections with Other Groups. The Muslim Brotherhood has had its share of internal disputes, some of which have resulted in the branching off of some members to form other Islamic groups. The only such split (though there were several disputes) in al-Banna’s time was the founding, in 1939, of Jam’iyat Shabab Sayyidind Muhammad (Society of Muhammad’s Youth). In 1945, after the passage of Law 49 governing PVOs, the society divided itself into two parts: the politically active section that continued under al-Banna’s leadership and a section concerned with welfare and social services that had its own leadership and structure. This charitable section continued to receive governmental assistance for its efforts in running schools, technical institutes, small industries, social work, hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries. Earlier, in 1942-1943, al-Banna’ had established alnizam al-khdss (“special section”), a secret apparatus inspired by the notion of jihdd and used as an instrument for the defense of Islam and of the society itself against police and various governments.
Other Islamist groups in Egypt either are offshoots of the Ikhwan or share its general goals of Islamic reform and implementation of shari`ah. Whether these groups are direct descendants of the Muslim Brotherhood, as some argue, or are independently founded and administered, most would agree that the Society of Muslim Brothers is the theological, if not political, grandparent of the numerous Islamist groupings in Egypt. They differ mainly in tactics, not goals. Many advocate violence and militancy, although the Ikhwan, since the 1970s, has advocated gradualism and working within the system in order to change it. (Still, there are divisions within the society over this issue.) The various Islamist groups include: al-Jihad (Holy Struggle), Jund Allah (God’s Troops), Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Army), Jam`iyat al-Tabligh (Society of Islamic Propagation), al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah (former Ikhwanmember Shukri Mustafa’s Society of Muslims), and al-Jama’at al-Islamiyah (Islamic Groups), among others. [See also Takfir wa al-Hijrah, Jama`at al-; -Jama’at alIslamiyah, al-.]
Many Egyptians claim to have no formal relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood yet support their goals and ideals. One of the more prominent of these is the popular religious leader Shaykh `Abd al-Hamid Kishk (b. 1933), who was a strong critic of Sadat’s government, its dependence on the United States, and its peace with Israel. His Friday sermons have been widely attended and distributed through tape recordings. As critical as he is of the government, he is equally supportive of the Ikhwan and other Islamic PVOs that provide affordable health care, day care, education, job training, development projects, access to credit, and other programs to help Egyptians. Kishk praises these efforts as he criticizes the government for its inability to provide for the needs of the vast majority of the Egyptian people. [See the biography of Kishk.]
Zaynab al-Ghazali (b. 1917), the most prominent woman associated with the Ikhwan and a regular contributor to Al-da’wah, is a fierce opponent of the feminist movement and a promoter of traditional Islamic values for women and men. She maintains that women can have an important public role as long as it is in the defense of Islam and traditional Islamic values. [See the biography of Ghazali]
The Muslim Brotherhood has mass appeal. Students, professors, doctors, lawyers, and other professionals have demonstrated their support for the organization in numerous elections on campuses and especially in syndicate and union elections.
The Ikhwan has had considerable influence beyond the borders of Egypt as well. There are or were strong branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine (founded in 1946), Jordan (licensed in 1953), Syria (c. 1935) Sudan, and Iraq. Egypt’s Ikhwan also had significant influence on other Islamist organizations not formally known as Muslim Brotherhood groups, most notably the Islami Jami’at-i Tulaba (Islamic Society of Students), a wing of the Jama’at-i Islam! (Islamic Party) of Pakistan.
Although various governments-monarchical and republican-have outlawed and restricted its activities, the very success and continuing popularity of the Ikhwan demonstrates to Egyptians and their government that Islamic groups in general can derive legitimacy from the positive influence they exert on the daily lives of the population. The government has thus resolved to deny legal recognition to the Ikhwan as either a political party or a Jam’iyah, but its de facto existence is accepted. The Ikhwan works within the present political and economic systems but must still work through other legal organizations-whether political parties or oncelegal economic enterprises, such as al-Rayan Investment Company-to pursue its dual goals of socioeconomic development and political influence.
[See also Egypt and the biographies of Banna’ and Qutb]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ayubi, Nazih N. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. London, 1991. In its numerous case studies of Islamic movements, this book provides analysis of the Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Jordan, Palestine, and Arabia.
Baker, Raymond William. Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt’s Political Soul. Cambridge, Mass., 1990 Chapter 8 deals with the Muslim Brothers in the 1970s and 1980s.
Banna’, Hasan al-. Mudhakkarat al-da’wah wa-al-da’iyah. N.p., c. 1951.
Esposito, John L. Islam and Politics. 3d ed. Syracuse, N.Y., 1991. Extensive analysis of the development of the Brotherhood as an alternative to secular nationalism in Egypt and beyond.
Hoffman, Valerie J. “An Islamic Activist: Zaynab al-Ghazali.” In Women and the Family in the Middle East, edited by Elizabeth W. Fernea, pp. 233-254. Austin, 1985.
pendency was forming, and during times of crisis, such as Black September in 1970, when the Jordanian army fought Palestinian guerrillas, the king was able to rely on the Muslim Brotherhood to be among his staunchest allies. However, by the end of the decade, the king was using the Muslim Brotherhood as a pawn in his foreign policy.
In 1980, as part of a continuing dispute between Jordan and Syria, the king encouraged al-Khallfah to establish paramilitary bases in the north of Jordan for the purpose of training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in a campaign to undermine the rule of President Hafez al-Assad. By allowing this training to occur on Jordanian soil, the king increased diplomatic and military tensions with Syria, resulting in a state of near-war, as Syrian and Jordanian troops were moved to the common border between the two countries.
The role of the Muslim Brotherhood during the crisis with Syria served to increase the political profile and legitimacy of the movement domestically. Support from local and foreign sponsors-including the Gulf statesfor the organization’s charitable activities, such as the building of an Islamic hospital in Amman, increased. In the sphere of political activities, the Muslim Brotherhood began to criticize openly aspects of the regime; corruption within the ruling elite, public immorality, and insensitivity to religious life were the main issues around which the Muslim Brotherhood organized its protest. However, the movement miscalculated the king’s response to this critique.
In 1985 the king publicly distanced himself from the Muslim Brotherhood in response to indirect attacks on his legitimacy as monarch and (more important) as political ruler. In a political climate of improved relations with Syria, King Hussein identified “Islamic elements” as responsible for the crisis in relations in 198o. He alleged that he had been misled by the Muslim Brothers and that their activities had been guided by foreign and hostile influences. He issued orders against the Muslim Brotherhood as a show of political strength. Muslim Brothers found themselves targeted by the Jordanian intelligence services as potential threats to the stability of the regime and witnessed government action against leaders of the movement; members of the movement were arrested, lost their jobs, or had their passports confiscated by the Jordanian intelligence services. It was the intention of the king to send a very clear message to the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood: he was willing to permit and even tacitly encourage a legitimate Islamic presence within the kingdom, but he was not willing to tolerate the Muslim Brotherhood if it sought to undermine the legitimacy of his rule in any way.
Democratization and Political Pluralism. The deterioration of relations between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood was resolved by the end of the 1980s, followed by a discernible improvement in relations. It became apparent that rather than isolate the movement the king had decided on a policy which would ultimately coopt the Muslim Brotherhood into the ruling strata of the regime. This policy was facilitated by the king’s decision in 1989 to hold the first full elections in over twenty-two years.
The call for the election was precipitated by a severe economic crisis within the kingdom which culminated in riots against government-imposed price rises on basic foodstuffs. The crisis was the result of decades of economic mismanagement within Jordan, and genuine hardships were thrust on the poorer sections of society. The Muslim Brotherhood’s critique of the early 1980s proved justified, a matter which took on added significance in view of the fact that its base of support was among the rural and urban poor, who were being asked to pay for the economic incompetence of the ruling oligarchy.
The king’s decision to hold elections as a response to the riots came as a surprise. It indicated that the Jordanian monarch was willing to institute democratization and political pluralism. It also meant that the king was, at least publicly, willing to surrender his monopoly of control over political life.
The Muslim Brothers perceived the general election as an opportunity to increase their political stake in the regime. The organization mounted a comprehensive election campaign under the slogan, “Islam is the solution.” The Muslim Brotherhood started the campaign with advantages over its political rivals. It had a constituency of support among the urban and rural poor. The brotherhood also appealed to the religiously conservative educated class, which was frustrated because of a lack of job opportunities and real prospects for social advancement. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood had been politically active for decades, while its adversaries in the elections remained proscribed and repressed.
The results of the election, therefore, should not have been surprising. Nevertheless, there was consternation in the kingdom when it was announced that the Muslim Brotherhood had won enough votes for twenty-two out industries, social work, hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries. Earlier, in 1942-1943, al-Banna’ had established alnizam al-khass (“special section”), a secret apparatus inspired by the notion of jihad and used as an instrument for the defense of Islam and of the society itself against police and various governments.
Other Islamist groups in Egypt either are offshoots of the Ikhwan or share its general goals of Islamic reform and implementation of shari’ah. Whether these groups are direct descendants of the Muslim Brotherhood, as some argue, or are independently founded and administered, most would agree that the Society of Muslim Brothers is the theological, if not political, grandparent of the numerous Islamist groupings in Egypt. They differ mainly in tactics, not goals. Many advocate violence and militancy, although the Ikhwan, since the 1970s, has advocated gradualism and working within the system in order to change it. (Still, there are divisions within the society over this issue.) The various Islamist groups include: al-Jihad (Holy Struggle), Jund Allah (God’s Troops), Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Army), Jam’iyat al-Tabligh (Society of Islamic Propagation), al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah (former Ikhwanmember Shukri Mustafa’s Society of Muslims), and alJama’at al-Islamlyah (Islamic Groups), among others. [See also Takfir wa al-Hijrah, Jama’at al-; Jama’at alIslamlyah, al-.]
Many Egyptians claim to have no formal relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood yet support their goals and ideals. One of the more prominent of these is the popular religious leader Shaykh `Abd al-Hamid Kishk (b. 1933), who was a strong critic of Sadat’s government, its dependence on the United States, and its peace with Israel. His Friday sermons have been widely attended and distributed through tape recordings. As critical as he is of the government, he is equally supportive of the Ikhwan and other Islamic PVOs that provide affordable health care, day care, education, job training, development projects, access to credit, and other programs to help Egyptians. Kishk praises these efforts as he criticizes the government for its inability to provide for the needs of the vast majority of the Egyptian people. [See the biography of Kishk.]
Zaynab al-Ghazali (b. 1917), the most prominent woman associated with the Ikhwan and a regular contributor to Al-da`wah, is a fierce opponent of the feminist movement and a promoter of traditional Islamic values for women and men. She maintains that women can have an important public role as long as it is in the defense of Islam and traditional Islamic values. [See the biography of Ghazah.]
The Muslim Brotherhood has mass appeal. Students, professors, doctors, lawyers, and other professionals have demonstrated their support for the organization in numerous elections on campuses and especially in syndicate and union elections.
The Ikhwan has had considerable influence beyond the borders of Egypt as well. There are or were strong branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine (founded in 1946), Jordan (licensed in 1953), Syria (c. 1935) Sudan, and Iraq. Egypt’s Ikhwan also had significant influence on other Islamist organizations not formally known as Muslim Brotherhood groups, most notably the Islami Jami’at-i Tulaba (Islamic Society of Students), a wing of the Jama`at-i Islami (Islamic Party) of Pakistan.
Although various governments-monarchical and republican-have outlawed and restricted its activities, the very success and continuing popularity of the Ikhwan demonstrates to Egyptians and their government that Islamic groups in general can derive legitimacy from the positive influence they exert on the daily lives of the population. The government has thus resolved to deny legal recognition to the Ikhwan as either a political party or a jam’iyah, but its de facto existence is accepted. The Ikhwan works within the present political and economic systems but must still work through other legal organizations-whether political parties or oncelegal economic enterprises, such as al-Rayan Investment Company-to pursue its dual goals of socioeconomic development and political influence.
[See also Egypt and the biographies of Bannd’ and Qutb.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ayubi, Nazih N. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. London, 1991. In its numerous case studies of Islamic movements, this book provides analysis of the Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Jordan, Palestine, and Arabia.
Baker, Raymond William. Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt’s Political Soul. Cambridge, Mass., 1990. Chapter 8 deals with the Muslim Brothers in the 1970s and 1980s.
Banna’, Hasan al-. Mudhakkarat al-da’wah wa-al-da’iyah. N.p., c. 1951.
Esposito, John L. Islam and Politics. 3d ed. Syracuse, N.Y., 1991. Extensive analysis of the development of the Brotherhood as an alternative to secular nationalism in Egypt and beyond.
Hoffman, Valerie J. “An Islamic Activist: Zaynab al-Ghazali.” In Women and the Family in the Middle East, edited by Elizabeth W. Fernea, pp. 233-254. Austin, 1985.
Husayni, Musd Ishaq al-. Al-Ikhwdn al-Muslimun: Kubrd al-harakdt al-Islamiyah al-hadithah. Beirut, 1952. Translated by John F. Brown et al., The Moslem Brethren. Beirut, 1956.
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. “Egypt’s Islamic Activism in the 1980s.” Third World Quarterly 10.2 (April 1988): 632-657.
Kepel, Gilles. Muslim Extremism in Egypt. Berkeley, 1985. Compares the neo-Muslim Brotherhood with the original leadership of the Ikhwdn and with leaders of other contemporary Islamic organizations in Egypt.
Mitchell, Richard P. The Society of the Muslim Brothers. London, 1969. The most detailed and authoritative account of the founding, development, and program of the Ikhwdn.
Qutb, Sayyid. Al-`adala al-ijtima`iyah fi al-Islam. 3d ed. N.p., n.d. Translated by John B. Hardie as Social justice in Islam. Washington, D.C., 1955.
Ramadan, Abdel Aziz. “Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups.” In Fundamentalisms and the State, edited by Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Chicago, 1993
Sivan, Emmanuel. Radical Islam. New Haven, 1985. General comparison between the Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Springborg, Robert. Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order. Boulder, 1989. Section on Islamicist opposition analyzes its strengths and weaknesses, generally, and the factionalization of the Brotherhood, in particular.
Zuhur, Sherifa. Revealing Reveiling: Islamist Gender Ideology in Contemporary Egypt. Albany, N.Y., 1992. Important discussion of the Ikhwan’s attitudes toward a host of gender-specific issues, such as birth control, polygamy, divorce, female education, veiling, and associational activity.
DENIS J. SULLIVAN

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – Hybrid Learning

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt