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JAMIYATUL `ULAMA’-I PAKISTAN

Batoota — Sat, 12 Jul 2014 08:40:26 +0000

JAMIYATUL `ULAMA’-I PAKISTAN. The party of Pakistan’s Barelwi `ulama’ the Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Pakistan was formed in Karachi in 1948 at the behest of Mawlanas `Abdulhamid Bada’uni, Sayyid Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri, and `Allamah Ahmad Sa’id Kazimi. After the Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam, it has been the largest `ulama’ party of Pakistan. The Jam`iyat follows the Barelwi school of Islamic thought, also known as the ahl-i sunnat wa jamacat (“people of the custom and community”), a term that reflects their claim to represent the true faith.

The Barelwls trace their origin to the teachings of Ahmad Riga Khan Barelwi (1856-1921), a scion of a notable `ulama’ family of Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, who had strong ties to the Qadiriyah Sufi order. The Barelwls, unlike other `ulama’ groups of the period or the Islamic movements that surfaced later, were not interested in promoting a puritanical interpretation of orthodoxy. Instead, they emerged to counter the impact of the Deobandl and Ahl-i Hadith traditions, both of which had sought to cleanse Islamic practices of cultural accretions and Sufism. The Barelwls adhered to the Hanafi school of law but aimed to preserve the place of Sufism and the popular customs associated with it in the life and thought of Indian Muslims. The Barelwls also accord the `ulama’ and $ufi pirs a central role as community leaders, vested with authority to intercede with God on behalf of the faithful.
By the turn of the century the Barelwi school had developed a strong following in northern India, relating popular Sufi practices to an orthodox reading of Islam. In Punjab too, where the Qadiriyah order has traditionally wielded much power, the Barelwls found a base, especially after the founding of the Darul Hizb-i Ahnaf (Congregation of the Hanafi Parties) in Lahore in the 1920s. They had little influence in the other four provinces that after 1947 became Pakistan-East Bengal, Sind, and the predominantly Deobandl North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. Throughout the struggle for partition, the Barelwls supported the Muslim League and were especially effective in bolstering the League’s position in Punjab. In 1946 this support was formalized when Barelwi `ulama’ from across India congregated in Benares to endorse Pakistan openly and to provide it with religious legitimacy.
Given this background, many Barelwls migrated to Pakistan in 1947, establishing a base in Sind among the refugee (muhajir) community. With a following in rural Punjab and urban Sind, Barelwls emerged as an important national force on the religious scene, second only to the Deobandis. The rivalry between the two for power and prominence, and the Barelwis’ desire to defend their flock from challenges by the Deobandis, soon led to the creation of a Barelwi `ulama’ party.
The Pakistani Deobandis had broken away from the pro-Congress Deobandi Party, Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind, to support the Muslim League and the demand for partition. In 1945 they had formed the Jam`iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam, whose contribution to the creation of the country was quickly rewarded with government patronage. The Barelwis viewed the privileged status of Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam with envy and concern, especially as Islam came to dominate national political discourse. Against this background in 1948, the Barelwi `ulama’ formed the Jam`iyatul `Ulama’-i Pakistan. The Jam’iyat was initially an `ulama’ forum designed to voice the interests of Barelwis; it had no plans for direct political activity. Between 1947 and 1958, the Jam’iyat actively participated in the debates among various Islamic parties and the government over the nature of the state of Pakistan and the necessity of an Islamic constitution for the country. Beyond this, it did not envisage a role for itself in national politics.
By the late 1960s, however, the Jam’iyat had become fully embroiled in politics under the force of three factors. The first was the increasing prominence of the Jamllyatul `Ulama’-i Islam and other Islamic parties such as the Jama`at-i Islami in the religious and political arenas from 1958 onward. Recall that the Barelwis had emerged in the first place to check the growth of puritanical interpretations of orthodoxy; thus it was not unexpected that the Jam`iyat would mobilize its resources to offset the influence of Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam and the Jama’at-i Islami. The Jam’iyat challenged the Jama’at-i Islami in forty-two constituencies in the national elections of 1970, defeating their opponents in several contests and dividing the religious vote in others to the advantage of secular parties. The rivalry between the two also stemmed from the fact that both had courted the Muhajir community of Sind since 1947
Second, the Jam’iyat was made aware of the power and potential of Islam in the political arena by revivalist groups in general, and the Jama’at-i Islami in particular. The Jam’iyat was not immune to the attraction of political power; moreover, it did not wish to leave the growing religious vote to be dominated by revivalist parties or the Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam. The decision to participate in the national elections of 1970, the first for the Jam`iyat, was taken after the Jama`at-i Islami flaunted the electoral potential of Islamic symbolisms by introducing its campaign with the Yaum-i Shaukat-i Islam (Day of Islam’s Glory), which was held throughout Pakistan in May 1970.
Third, the Jam`iyat became interested in politics in response to the challenge of the secularist regime (19581969) of Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan to the place of Islam in Pakistani society. The Ayub regime sought to roll back the gains made by religious parties during the preceding decade, proposed a modernist view of Islam with the aim of depoliticizing the Islamic parties, and finally sought to extend the power of the state into the domain of the `ulama’ The Jam`iyat was opposed to Ayub’s modernist agenda but was especially perturbed by the government’s appropriation of religious endowments and takeover of the management of religious shrines; both actions affected Barelwis and their allies in the Sufi establishment directly. The Jam’iyat was also opposed to the government’s attempts to seize control of its mosques. In response to Ayub Khan’s policies, the Jam`iyat became more directly involved in politics in the 1960s to protect the Barelwis’ interests. By the mid-1960s, under the leadership of Mawlana Shah Ahmad Nurani, the Jam’iyat became a vociferous actor in the political arena; it now included lay members and leaders and addressed issues of national concern. In 1970, for instance, it launched a strong campaign to counter Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
Following the secession of Bangladesh and the rise of the populist Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto to power, the Jam’iyat, along with other Islamic parties, became even more actively involved in politics. The secularist and left-of-center politics of the Bhutto government allowed the Islamic parties to assume the leadership of the opposition. The Jam`iyat coordinated its activities closely with those of other Islamic parties in the antigovernment Nizam-i Mustafa (Order of the Prophet) movement, which undermined the Bhutto regime. In fact, Nurani was chosen by the movement to succeed Bhutto as prime minister. Later the Jam’iyat also lent support to the military regime of General Muhammad Zia ulHaq, who took over the reins of power in 1977.
True to its founding ideals, the Jam’iyat was also the first Islamic party to distance itself from the Zia regime and its puritanical view of Islam. The party was not, however, able to escape the impact of the increasingly strict adherence to orthodoxy that swept across Pakistan in the I98os. By the end of that decade, elements within the Jam`iyat had moved close to the doctrinal positions of Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam and the Jama’at-i Islam!. More significantly, the party suffered as a consequence of its direct involvement in politics. Clashes over policy decisions since 1969 divided the Jam’iyat into factions. One faction led by Nurani decided to stay away from the Islam! Jumhuri Ittihad (IJI or Islamic Democratic Alliance), which was formed by the pro-Zia parties to challenge Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples’ Party, and instead allied itself with an offshoot of Jam`iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam to form the Islamic Democratic Front. The other faction under the leadership of Mawlana `Abdussattar Niyazi decided to remain with IJI.
Since 1986, the Jam’iyat, like other Islamic parties, has lost much of its support because of the proliferation of self-styled Sunni parties throughout Pakistan, and because of the meteoric rise of the ethnic party Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM or Muhajir National Movement) in the urban centers of Sind. In the 1970 elections the party received 8.2 percent of the popular vote and won seven seats in the National Assembly, but in the 1990 elections its share of the vote had fallen to 1.47 percent, winning only four seats. Despite this setback, the party continues to operate as an important force on the religious scene and wields significant power in the political arena from its stronghold in rural Punjab. The party’s student wing, Anjuman-i Tulaba-i Islam (Association of Islamic Students), established in the I98os, now controls numerous campuses in Punjab.
[See also Barelwis; Deobandis; Jama’at-i Islam!; Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam; Pakistan; Qadiriyah]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbott, Freeland. Islam and Pakistan. Ithaca, N.Y., 1968. Good summary of interactions between various Islamic groups in Pakistan. Afzal, Rafique. Political Parties in Pakistan, 1947-1958. Islamabad, 1976. Concise account of party politics in Pakistan in the 19471958 period.
Ahmad, `Abdul-Ghafur. Phir Marshal La A-Giyd (Then Came the Martial Law). Lahore, 1988. Good account of the politics of the Islamic parties in the 1970s.
Ahmad, Mumtaz. “Islam and the State: The Case of Pakistan.” In The Religious Challenge to the State, edited by Matthew Moen and Lowell Gustafson, pp. 239-267. Philadelphia, 1992. Good account of the issues before Islamic parties during the Ayub, Bhutto, and Zia regimes.
Binder, Leonard. Religion and Politics in Pakistan. Berkeley, 1961.
The standard work on religion and politics in Pakistan in the 19471956 period.
Ewing, Katherine. “The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan.” Journal of Asian Studies 42.2 (February 1983): 251-268. Authoritative outline of the changing political issues surrounding Sufism in Pakistan.
Gilmartin, David. Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan. Berkeley, 1988. Contains a good account of the activities of the Barelwis in the Punjab between the two world wars.
Metcalf, Barbara D. Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900. Princeton, 1982. Contains an excellent sketch of the Barelwi tradition.
SEYYED VALI REZA NASR
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JAM’IYATUL `ULAMA’-I- ISLAM

Batoota — Fri, 11 Jul 2014 17:10:34 +0000

JAM’IYATUL `ULAMA’-I ISLAM. The origins of the Jamclyatul `Ulama’-i Islam (JUI, Society of Muslim `Ulama’) can be traced to the Deoband movement in prepartition India and to the `ulama’ who consitituted the Jam’iyatul `Ulama-i Hind (Society of Indian `Ulama’). Such `ulama’ have been typically characterized as “Indian nationalists,” because during the latter days of British India they were unalterably opposed to British imperialism, supported the aims and policies of the Indian National Congress, and opposed the Muslim League’s struggle for an independent Pakistan. Consequently, following the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the creation of Pakistan, the political significance of the JUI was limited, and its leadership was held suspect by successive Pakistani regimes that condemned the JUI’s role in the independence struggle as anti-Pakistan. Indeed, until the late 1960s the JUI remained almost wholly a religious organization with little if any political significance.

This situation changed during the so-called “Disturbances” of 1968-1969 that led ultimately to the resignation of General Muhammad Ayub Khan and to the holding of general elections in 1970. During the ferment of 1969 the JUI split into two factions-a Karachi-based faction under the leadership of Maulana Ihtishamul Haqq Thanvi (later named Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Pakistan, Thanvi Group), and a larger and far more politically active faction led by Maulana Mufti Mahmud and Maulana Ghaus Hazarvi and based in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The latter faction (the MuftiHazarvi Group, hereafter JUI) actively participated in the 1970 general elections as a populist-oriented party, appealing to activist Islamic sentiment. The JUI’s program called for the establishment of an Islamic constitution in accordance with the recommendations of the
Board of `Ulama’ as presented to the Basic Principles Committee Of 1954, which had called for the adoption of the shari`ah as the basis of Pakistan’s consitutional structure. The JUI also called for the end of “capitalist exploitation” and for the establishment of a program of Islamic social welfare including free education, health care, and the introduction of minimum-wage legislation.
The combination of such populist rhetoric, the prestige of the `ulama’ and the JUI’s effective control of relevant mosques led to success at the polls. In the 1970 general election the JUI swept the electoral districts of southern NWFP and entered into a coalition with the National Awami Party (NAP) to form provincial governments in NWFP and Baluchistan. The subsequent naming of Maulana Mufti Mahmud as chief minister of the NWFP (1971-1973) marked the first and only time in Pakistan’s history that an Islam-based party has headed a provincial government.
During Mufti Mahmud’s short-lived tenure his government managed to introduce three laws designed to promote Islam in the province. The first established prohibition of alcohol; the second introduced an Islamic law of pre-emption (i.e., regarding inheritance of land); and the third mandated the enforced observance of the Ramadan fast. These laws have remained on the books in NWFP and have significantly influenced the course of the islamization process in Pakistan during the 1980s and 1990s. The JUI-NAP government of NWFP resigned in early 1973 in protest over Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s perceived persecution of NAP leaders. In the 1977 general elections the JUI allied itself with the antiBhutto coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance. Subsequently the party cooperated, at times reluctantly, with the regime of Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988), and it tacitly supported the IJM (Islamic Democratic Alliance) government of Nawaz Sharif (1990-1992). The JUI maintains a small but loyal and enthusiastic following in the southern region of NWFP and the Pathan-majority areas of Baluchistan. In the 1988 and 1990 general elections it gained seven and six seats respectively in the National Assembly.
During the past decade, under the leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, son of the late Mufti Mahmud, the JUI has become increasingly associated with Islamic orthodoxy. In their religious views JUI members are often criticized by their opponents as “uncompromisingly rigid,” insisting on the strict enforcement of the shari`ah as interpreted by the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. In addition, it is often charged that the JUI is anti-Shi’i. The Jul did support Iraq during the IranIraq war, but it joined the TNFJ (Tahrlk-i Nifaz-i Filth-i Ja’fariyah, the most prominent Pakistani ShN group) in its condemnation of the United States’ role in the Gulf War. Also, Jul `ulama’ are often characterized as opposed to innovation in matters Islamic and as favoring a strict social and moral code, especially with respect to gender relations. Indeed, Jul `ulama’ often draw the ire of Pakistan’s feminist organizations.
Politically, the Jul has been at the forefront of the attempt to implement far-reaching Islamic reforms. This is evidenced by the formulation and introduction in 1985, by the Jul Senators Maulana Sami’ul Haqq and Qazi `Abdullatif, of the so-called “Shariat Bill.” The Jul version of this bill proposed that the shari’ah wholly replace Pakistan’s secular constitution. `Ulama’ associated with the Jul have also been very active in proposing petitions before the Federal Shariat Court calling for significant changes in Pakistan’s social and moral practices to bring them more into keeping with Islamic norms. Generally, Jul members were displeased with what they viewed as the slow pace of Islamic reform under President Zia, and they have been even less pleased with successor regimes.
The 1993 general election proved disappointing to the Jul. The party contested the election under the banner of the newly created Islami Jumhuri Mahaz (Islamic Democratic Association, IJM) and entered into an “electoral arrangement” with the Pakistan People’s Party. However, even after intensive electoral campaigning, the IJM was only able to gain 2.3 percent of the popular vote and four seats. Despite such electoral disappointment, the Jul remains a potent social and political force in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Indeed, the party has deepened its populist image and style. But more important, it has maintained its control over the largest number of mosques and madrasahs in Pakistan, and therefore has the strongest base among the madrasah student body in the state.
[See also Pakistan.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahmad, Mumtaz. “The Politics of War: Islamic Fundamentalisms in Pakistan.” In Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, edited by J. P. Piscatori, pp. 155-185. Chicago, 1991.
Kennedy, Charles H. “Repugnancy to Islam-Who Decides? Islam and Legal Reform in Pakistan.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 41 (1992): 769-787.
CHARLES H. KENNEDY
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JAM`IYATUL `ULAMA’-I HIND

Batoota — Fri, 11 Jul 2014 17:01:21 +0000

JAM`IYATUL `ULAMA’-I HIND. An organization of Muslim religious scholars of India, the Jam’Iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind (Association of the `Ulama’ of India) was established in November 1919, when numerous `ulama’ from all parts of India came to participate in the Khilafat Movement conference in New Delhi [see Khilafat Movement]. The organization came into being when Indians of all religious affiliations were united in the anti-British struggle. Mohandas Gandhi embraced the cause of the Ottoman caliphate, and most Muslim leaders participated in the noncooperation movement with the Indian National Congress. The Jam’Iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind maintained its pro-Congress attitude throughout the struggle for independence and stood at the head of those Indian Muslims who supported the idea of a united India and opposed the Pakistan movement. (Some of its members, however, seceded in 1946 and established the Jam’Iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam, which supported Pakistan [see Jam`iyatul `Ulama’-i Islam].) Many of the members were associated with the Dar al`Ulum of Deoband. Since its establishment in 1919, the association has held annual conferences in which the `ulama’ have expressed their views on the central issues of the day.
The main contribution of the Jam’Iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind to Indo-Muslim thought is the theory of “composite nationalism” (muttahida qawmiyat). This theory, which was elaborated in speeches and writings of the Jam’Iya leadership and particularly in the works of its longtime president Husain Ahmad Madan! (18791957) served as an alternative to the “two nations theory” (do qawmi nazariyat) of the Muslim League, which formed the ideological basis of the Pakistan movement. According to the theory of “composite nationalism,” nations can be created by various factors, such as religion, race, homeland, language, or color. In this analysis, a “nation” (qawm) is not an exclusive category: a person can belong simultaneously to several “nations” created by different characteristics. In modern times, the most important nation-building factor has been the homeland; the Muslims of India therefore belong to the same nation as other Indians, and India constitutes a nation despite its religious diversity. Nevertheless, according to the religious criterion, Muslims continue to belong to the Muslim (qawm)
The Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind thus accepted the idea of territorial nationalism. This is a novel idea in Islamic thought, and the `ulama’ devoted considerable intellectual effort to provide it with Islamic legitimacy. The classical Islamic precedent repeatedly used for this purpose is the Covenant of Medina (`ahd al-ummah), the document that the Prophet is said to have issued in order to regulate the relationship between the Emigrants (muhajirun), the Helpers (ansdr), and the Jews in Medina after the Hijrah. One of its sections states that “the Jews of `Awf are one community with the believers; the Jews have their religion and the Muslims theirs.” The `ulama’ concluded from this passage that the Prophet himself agreed to the inclusion of non-Muslims in the same nation with Muslims. The history of Mughal India is also seen as vindicating the composite nationalism theory. The Mughal period knew no communalism (firqah vdriyat, firqah parasti); all Indians were treated equally by the rulers. Although the Muslims who established the Mughal empire came from outside India, once they settled there they became an inextricable part of Indian nationhood (hindustani gawmiyat). Communalism emerged in India only as a result of British policies.
The practical political conclusion from this interpretation of Muslim and Indo-Muslim history was the demand that Muslims cooperate with the Indian National Congress in order to expel the British from India and to achieve independence for the country. The `ulama’ envisaged that in an independent and united India, achieved with Muslim cooperation, the Muslims would have significant influence, their family law and religious institutions would be maintained, and governments with a Muslim majority would be established in several provinces. On the basis of these expectations, they appealed to Muslims not to join the Muslim League, even declaring membership in it a sin. The `ulama’ were convinced that the Western-educated element so prominent in the League’s leadership would never be able or willing to establish an Islamic state compatible with the traditional religious ideal of the `ulama’ They also maintained that the establishment of Pakistan would not solve the communal problem because many millions of Muslims would remain in the Indian part of the subcontinent and would live in an atmosphere of hate generated by the partition. On the other hand, the establishment of a strong and unified India, in which the Muslims would be an influential and significant minority, would benefit not only the Muslims of the subcontinent but also the Muslims of the rest of the world.
The views of the Jam’iya did not prevail during the struggle for independence, and in 1947 the subcontinent was partitioned between India and Pakistan. In independent India the Jam`iya acquired increased importance in the new political structure. In contradistinction to the Muslim League and other organizations that supported the creation of Pakistan, the Jam’iya possessed impeccable credentials of opposition to partition and was a natural candidate to represent Indian Muslims. Shortly after independence, the `ulama’ called upon Indian Muslims to declare their unswerving loyalty to India. Several of the ideas adopted by the `ulama’ after partition were rather bold from the vantage point of traditional Islam. They accepted the idea of a secular state, which they conceived as neutral in matters of religion. They gave qualified support to the idea of a composite Indian culture. They severed all ties with Jam’iya branches in the territories now incorporated in Pakistan, even though this was a country established in the name of Islam and inhabited mostly by Muslims. They supported Indian policies even on issues that were sensitive from the Muslim point of view, such as Kashmir and Hyderabad.
The Jam’iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind is a rare, and possibly unique, case of an association of traditional Muslim religious scholars who have willingly bestowed legitimacy upon the policies of a non-Muslim and professedly secular government, born out of conflict with the generally acknowledged leadership of their own community.
[See also All-India Muslim League; India; Pakistan.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahmad, Aziz. Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964. London and New York, 1967, pp. 186-194.
Faruqi, Zia-ul-Hasan. The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan. Bombay, 1963.
Friedmann, Yohanan. “The Attitude of the Jam`iyyat al-`ulama’-I Hind to the Indian National Movement and to the Establishment of Pakistan.” Asian and African Studies 7 (1971): 157-180. Friedmann, Yohanan, “The jam’iyyat al-`ulama’-i Hind in the Wake of Partition.” Asian and African Studies I I (1976): 181-211. Hardy, Peter. Partners in Freedom-and True Muslims: The Political Thought of Some Muslim Scholars in British India, 1912-1947. Lund, 1971.
Mushir-ul-Haq. Islam in Secular India. Simla, 1972. Important for the postindependence period.
Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain. Ulema in Politics: A Study Relating to the Activities of the Ulema in the South-Asian Subcontinent from 1556 to 1947. New Delhi, 1985. Criticism of the activities of the Jam`iyatul `Ulama’-i Hind from a Pakistani vantage point.
YOHANAN FRIEDMANN